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1121 
When Drills and Pipelines Cross Indigenous Lands 
in the Americas 
Guillermo J. Garcia Sanchez* 
From the Missouri River, passing through the Sonora Desert, all the 
way down to the Amazon Forest and the Andean Mountains, drills and 
pipelines are crossing over indigenous lands.  In an energy-thirsty 
continent, there is no land left to spare, not even tribal land.  Many of these 
energy infrastructure projects involve international investments that are 
protected by treaties and enforced by arbitral tribunals.  At the same time, 
tribal communities have an internationally recognized right to receive 
prior and informed consultation before they are affected by projects of this 
nature.  The Article focuses on the clash of rights between energy 
extraction companies investing abroad, and persons in indigenous 
communities whose lands are being condemned or disturbed to facilitate 
these companies’ extraction activities.  As the Article explains, 
international treaties force the State to protect both these interests and 
set up norms, backed by international judicial interpretations, that 
prioritize the economic benefits of resource extraction in the name of 
public benefits.  Consequently, when the rights of investors and 
communities clash, governments almost categorically side with the 
interests of foreign investors, at the sacrifice of the interests of local 
communities.  The Article sees this course as endorsing a societal view that 
elevates economic considerations over noneconomic considerations and 
advocates a more pluralistic societal view that sees noneconomic 
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considerations on par with (and at times, of superior importance to) 
economic considerations. 
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I.  INTRODUCTION 
In the summer of 2015, Sempra Energy announced that it had been 
awarded a natural gas transportation contract worth $108 million in 
northern Mexico.1  The project was one of the earliest results of the 
opening of Mexican energy markets to foreign investment.2  The 
pipeline was to start in Arizona, stretch down 833 kilometers cutting 
through the Sonora Desert, and provide U.S. natural gas to a combined-
cycle power generation plant of the Mexican state-owned company in 
Chihuahua.3  The project exemplified the continuing integration of U.S. 
and Mexican energy markets.  For this, and many other projects, 
Mexico’s Minister of Energy, Pedro Joaquin Coldwell, received the 2015 
“Minister of the Year” award.4 
A year later, two members of the Loma de Bacum Yaqui indigenous 
community in Sonora were murdered, and three hundred others were 
up in arms protesting against the construction of a nine-mile stretch of 
the pipeline over their lands.5  The Loma de Bacum Yaqui community 
complained that the government did not respect their rights to be 
consulted before approving the pipeline project and that the crossing of 
the infrastructure through their lands was a violation of their ancestral 
way of life.6  The community further rejected the company’s monetary 
compensation for their losses and the employment offers to its 
 
 1 Dennis Fandrich & Mark Iden, Sempra Energy Secures Gas Pipeline Transportation 
Contract in Chihuahua, Mexico, PIPELINE TECH. J. (2015), https://www.pipeline-
journal.net/news/sempra-energy-secures-gas-pipeline-transportation-contract-
chihuahua-mexico. 
 2 See generally Guillermo Jose Garcia Sanchez, The Fine Print of the Mexican Energy 
Reform, in MEXICO´S NEW ENERGY MODEL (2018) (describing the importance and legal 
framework of the Mexican energy reform of 2013). 
 3 Fandrich & Iden, supra note 1. 
 4 Mexico Secretary of Energy, El Secretario de Energía, Pedro Joaquín Coldwell, 
recibió premio a Ministro del Año 2015 [Secretary of Energy, Pedro Joaquín Coldwell, 
received the 2015 Minister of the Year award], GOBIERNO DE MÉXICO (Sep. 17, 2015), 
https://www.gob.mx/sener/prensa/el-secretario-de-energia-pedro-joaquin-coldwell-
recibio-premio-a-ministro-del-ano-2015. 
 5 Yaqui Communities Clash Over Pipeline, MEX. NEWS DAILY (Oct. 22, 2016), 
https://mexiconewsdaily.com/news/yaqui-communities-clash-over-pipeline. 
 6 The report explains how the activist of the loma de Baum community rejected the 
monetary compensation offered by the company for being an example of a model that 
seeks to integrate communities into an economic system that disrespects their ways of 
life and rights.  The public policies adopted by the State displaces the communities from 
their ancestral lands, forces them to work for the transnational companies and attempts 
against their culture.  Gema Villela Valenzuela, Yaquis denuncian amenazas de Segob por 
gasoducto, CIMACNOTICIAS (2016), https://cimacnoticias.com.mx/noticia/yaquis-
denuncian-amenazas-de-segob-por-gasoducto (last visited Mar 3, 2021). 
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members.7  By the spring of 2019, the pipeline had been sabotaged 
several times, and no agreement was in sight.8  Even though the 
pipelines were either idle or incomplete and not delivering gas, the 
Mexican government had to pay investors the regular rate because the 
delays and circumstances were beyond the foreign investors’ control.9  
Under the force majeure contract terms, circumstances out of Sempra’s 
control included sabotages, challenges to the consultation processes 
with indigenous people, land title issues, and local authorities’ 
permits.10  In the summer of 2019, the bill piled up to around three 
billion dollars, and Mexico’s new administration announced that it 
would pursue an arbitration proceeding against the companies in an 
effort to redefine the contract’s terms.11  The announcement brought 
down Sempra’s shares by 1.1% and its Mexican subsidiary’s shares by 
4%.12  After months of negotiation between the state-owned company 
and Sempra, the State signed an agreement to lower the bill but 
promised to continue with the project.13  The Yaquis were left with no 
other option but to continue their protest.14  Unfortunately, the Yaquis’ 
story is not unique to Mexico but rather a phenomenon present in the 
Americas and connected to a deeper energy integration process.  
Energy integration in the northern hemisphere is now possible 
because of Mexico’s 2012 decision to open up its sector to private 
parties and the renegotiation of the North America Free Trade 
Agreement (NAFTA), now replaced by the U.S.-Mexico-Canada 
Agreement (USMCA).15  The old NAFTA framework lacked any 
 
 7 Id. 
 8 Rob Nikolewski, Sempra’s Subsidiary in Mexico Looks to Put Sabotaged Pipeline 
Back into Service, MORNING CALL (Mar. 4, 2019), https://www.mcall.com/sd-fi-sempra-
mexico-pipeline-20190304-story.html. 
 9 Sergio Chapa, Abbot to AMLO: Wrap Up Pipeline Probe and Get Natural Gas Moving 
South, HOUS. CHRON. (Aug. 6, 2019), https://www.houstonchronicle.com/business/
energy/article/Abbott-to-AMLO-Wrap-up-pipeline-probe-and-get-14281518.php. 
 10 Id. 
 11 Dave Graham, Mexico’s President Defiant in Row with Canada Over Pipeline 
Contract, REUTERS (June 27, 2019), https://www.reuters.com/article/us-mexico-ienova-
canada/mexicos-president-defiant-in-row-with-canada-over-pipeline-contracts-
idUSKCN1TS1XF. 
 12 Id. 
 13 Mexico Reaches Deal with Private Gas Pipeline Firms, ASSOCIATED PRESS (Aug. 27, 
2019), https://apnews.com/d389467505724d84b6a9a5f85f8de72f (last visited Sep 
20, 2019). 
 14 Id. 
 15 Corey Paul, USMCA Deal to Keep Tariffs Off North American Oil, Gas Trade, S&P 
GLOBAL MARKET INTELLIGENCE (Dec. 10, 2019), https://www.spglobal.com/market
intelligence/en/news-insights/latest-news-headlines/56067737 (describing how the 
USMCA and the opening of Mexico’s sector in 2013 allow the energy markets of U.S. and 
Mexico to integrate further); Shawn Donnan, Andrew Mayeda, Jenny Leonard & Jeremy 
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protection for U.S. or Canadian companies making deals with Mexico in 
the production, transportation, and exploitation of hydrocarbons.16  The 
state-owned companies, Comision Federal de Electricidad (CFE) and 
Petroleos Mexicanos (PEMEX), reserved authority over energy 
production and hydrocarbon development, respectively.17  Moreover, 
the construction of energy infrastructure and the integration of the 
region are part of a broader conversation involving strategic 
investments in Central America in order to boost their economies and 
reduce migration flows.18  An energy integration strategy that begins in 
the Tar Sands of Canada and continues all the way down to the 
Amazonian region is a key component to rebuilding governance in the 
Americas.19   
All of these discussions surrounding energy integration are 
happening while the three nations are debating the way energy 
investments affect vulnerable communities.20  In the case of Mexico, one 
only needs to remember that the Zapatista indigenous rebellion started 
the day NAFTA entered into force, and the exclusion of their rights in the 
treaty was one of the elements that triggered the uprising.21  In the case 
of the U.S., the Keystone XL and the North Dakota pipeline conflicts with 
the Sioux tribes are recent reminders of the tensions that emerge among 
 
C.F. Lin, Trump’s ‘Historic’ Trade Deal: How Different is it From Nafta?, BLOOMBERG (Oct. 2, 
2018), https://www.bloomberg.com/graphics/2018-nafta-vs-usmca. 
 16 Guillermo J Garcia Sanchez, The Mexican Petroleum License of 2013, in THE 
CHARACTER OF PETROLEUM LICENSES: A LEGAL CULTURE ANALYSIS 27 (Tina Soliman Hunter et 
al. eds., 2020). 
 17 Id. at 15, 17, 19, 27. 
 18 PETER MEYER, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., U.S. STRATEGY FOR ENGAGEMENT IN CENTRAL 
AMERICA: POLICY ISSUES FOR CONGRESS, 6–7 (2019), https://fas.org/sgp/crs/row/R44
812.pdf; Albert Wynn, A Reliable Power Grid in Central America May Resolve Migrant 
Crisis INSIDESOURCES (Sept. 10, 2019), https://www.insidesources.com/a-reliable-
power-grid-in-central-america-may-resolve-migrant-crisis; Economic Commission for 
Latin America and the Caribbean, ECLAC Presents the Central America-Mexico 
Comprehensive Development Plan to the Government of Honduras, ECLAC (July 25, 2019), 
https://www.cepal.org/en/pressreleases/eclac-presents-central-america-mexico-
comprehensive-development-plan-government [hereinafter Caribbean]. 
 19 MEYER, supra note 18 at 7; Wynn, supra note 18; Caribbean, supra note 18.  For the 
impact on U.S.-Canada energy integration, see Ben Cahill, U.S.-Canada Energy Trade in 
2019, CSIS (Dec. 1, 2020), https://www.csis.org/analysis/us-canada-energy-trade-
2019.  
 20 See generally S. James Anaya & Sergio Puig, Mitigating State Sovereignty: The Duty 
to Consult with Indigenous People, 67 U. TORONTO L.J. 435 (2017); Robert J. Miller, 
Consultation or Consent: The United States’ Duty to Confer with American Indian 
Governments, 91 N. D. L. REV. 37 (2015). 
 21 Paul Imison, How NAFTA Explains the Two Mexicos, ATLANTIC (2017), 
https://www.theatlantic.com/international/archive/2017/09/nafta-mexico-trump-
trade/540906 (last visited Feb 12, 2021). 
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companies, authorities, and communities.22  The same can be said of 
indigenous communities’ anti-fracking opposition to the “Idle No More” 
movement in Canada, during which they were violently confronted by 
the Royal Canadian Mounted Police in New Brunswick.23  According to 
data from the Environmental Justice Atlas, ninety active social conflicts 
involving fossil fuels and climate justice/energy conflicts have been 
reported in the three countries,24 representing approximately 25 
percent of the total active social conflicts in the three nations 
combined.25   
Government negotiators often treat free trade, energy, and 
indigenous rights as separate fields, but in practice, they interact with 
and affect each other.  International legal scholars typically overlook this 
overlap as well.26  International business transactions courses and 
academic articles rarely include the study of community rights.27  On the 
other hand, human rights literature usually fails to include the study of 
 
 22 For a description of this conflict and the ongoing legal battles regarding the 
pipeline see James W. Coleman, Policymaking by Proposal: How Agencies Are 
Transforming Industry Investment Long Before Rules Can Be Tested in Court, 24 GEO. 
MASON L. REV. 497, 514–15 (2017); James W. Coleman, Beyond the Pipeline Wars: 
Reforming Environmental Assessment of Energy Transport, 2018 UTAH L. REV. 119, 
137–39 (2018) [hereinafter Coleman, Beyond the Pipeline Wars]; James W. Coleman, 
Pipelines & Power-lines: Building the Energy Transport Future, 80 OHIO ST. L.J. 263, 
281–83 (2019). 
 23 Brenna Bhandar, The First Nations of Canada Are Still Waiting for the Colonial Era 
to End, GUARDIAN (Oct. 21, 2013), https://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/2013/
oct/21/canada-colonial-mentality-first-nations. 
 24 Leah Temper, Daniela del Bene & Joan Martinez-Alier, Mapping the Frontiers and 
Front Lines of Global Environmental Justice: the EJAtlas, 22 J. POLIT. ECOL. 255 (2015); 
Mapping Environmental Justice, ENVIRONMENTAL JUSTICE ATLAS, https://ejatlas.org/ (last 
visited Sept. 25, 2019).  I used the Atlas per country available on the website and 
categorized those conflicts as Fossil Fuels and Climate Justice/Energy.  As of February 
22, 2021, the Atlas identifies 24 conflicts for Mexico, 45 for the U.S., and 21 for Canada.  
See Countries, ENVIRONMENTAL JUSTICE ATLAS, https://ejatlas.org/country. 
 25 Id.  The total number of social conflicts reported by country are the following: 
United States 152, Mexico 139, Canada 62.  Id. 
 26 Sergio Puig, International Indigenous Economic Law, 52 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 1243, 
1247 (2019). 
 27 Take for example the classical introductory book on International Business 
Transactions from Ralph Folsom et al, where there is a full section on the protection of 
foreign investments, regulatory takings, and international dispute resolution 
mechanisms, but there is no mention of the companies’ obligation to respect human 
rights, indigenous rights, the environment, etc.  RALPH FOLSOM, MICHAEL WALLACE GORDON 
& JOHN SPANGOLE, INTERNATIONAL BUSINESS TRANSACTIONS IN A NUTSHELL (8th ed. 2009).  
Another example can be found in Rudolph Dolzer and Christopher Schreuer’s classical 
book, “Principles of International Investment Law,” where there is no mention of the 
companies’ relations with communities or human rights norms, but there is a full section 
of political risk insurance and the principles that protect foreign direct investment 
against interference with their assets.  RUDOLPH DOLZER & CHRISTOPH SCHREUER, PRINCIPLES 
OF INTERNATIONAL INVESTMENT LAW (2008). 
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international companies and their investment rights.28  The investment 
system and the human rights regime are traditionally studied as 
separate silos, where specialized courts develop principles and 
standards to bring consistency and systematicity to each regime.29  
Scholars and adjudicators might borrow from other fields, but they do 
not see them as belonging to the same sphere.30  As stated by Professor 
Sergio Puig: “Except for the occasional shared conference or workshop, 
these fields are typically separated into distinct, often insular, epistemic 
communities.”31  The global efforts that have tried to attend this 
disparity focus on the duties that nonstate actors, such as international 
companies, have to respect human rights.32  Indigenous people’s 
advocates focus on delineating the extent to which government 
responsibilities can be extended to powerful actors such as 
transnational corporations.33  In the same vein, investment law scholars 
who are interested in addressing the social implications of foreign 
investment advocate for the inclusion of amicus briefs by affected 
communities in the proceedings and for the inclusion of social corporate 
responsibility principles in investment treaties.34 
 
 28 MARIA VICTORIA CABRERA ORMAZA, THE REQUIREMENT OF CONSULTATION WITH INDIGENOUS 
PEOPLES IN THE ILO (1st ed. 2017); Jason Tockman, Eliding Consent in Extractivist States: 
Bolivia, Canada, and the UN Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples, 22 INT’L J. 
HUM. RTS. 325 (2018); Tara Ward, The Right to Free, Prior, and Informed Consent: 
Indigenous Peoples’ Participation Rights within International Law, 10 NW. J. INT’L HUM. RTS. 
54 (2011); Siegfried Wiessner, The Cultural Rights of Indigenous Peoples: Achievements 
and Continuing Challenges, 22 EUR. J. INT’L LAW 121 (2011). 
 29 Puig, supra note 26, at 1251. 
 30 See generally Sergio Puig and Gregory Shaffer, Imperfect Alternatives: Institutional 
Choice and the Reform of Investment Law, 112 AM. J. INT’L LAW 361 (2018) (describing 
how different advocates for the reform of investment law approach the process from 
three different angles: efficiency (law and economics scholars), fairness (Rawlsian-
oriented scholars), and interstate relations, power, and conflicts (realist-oriented 
scholars.)). 
 31 Puig, supra note 26, at 1251.  Another example of scholars creating a bridge to 
connect fields can be found in Mariana Hernandez Crespo G., A New Chapter in Natural 
Resource-Seeking Investment Using Shared Decisions System Design (SDSD) to Strengthen 
Investor-State and Community Relationships, 18 CARDOZO J. CONFLICT RESOL. 551, 564–65, 
580, 585 (2017). 
 32 U.N. Human Rights Council, Guiding Principles on Business and Human Rights, 
U.N. Docs. HR/PUB/11/04; James Anaya, Report of the Special Rapporteur on the Right 
of Indigenous People on Extractive Industries Operating Within or Near Indigenous 
Territories, U.N. Docs. A/HRC/18/35 (July 11, 2011), https://www.ohchr.org/
Documents/Issues/IPeoples/SR/A-HRC-18-35_en.pdf. 
 33 U.N. Human Rights Council, Guiding Principles on Business and Human Rights, 
supra note 32. 
 34 FAROUK EL-HOSSENY, CIVIL SOCIETY IN INVESTMENT TREATY ARBITRATION: STATUS AND 
PROSPECTS 251–54 (2018) (offering a comprehensive study of all the efforts by the 
system to include civil society in the arbitral proceedings). 
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This Article follows the invitation of this new scholarship to reflect 
on whether energy projects, investor rights, and community rights 
should be analyzed as belonging to the same field.35  It invites the reader 
to see investment law, energy law, and community rights as different 
views of the same cathedral.  But instead of shedding light on the arcs of 
duties that connect government and companies in a globalized 
economy, it takes us to the underground crypt of the cathedral—to the 
foundations of the State’s right to extract natural resources.  The 
development of energy projects depends on who owns the resources 
necessary to produce and transport energy, and on what types of 
relationships emerge from the “bundle of rights” created by property 
law.  This Article takes the view that the three fields, investment, human 
rights, and sovereign rights over natural resources, give normative 
meaning to the way international law deals with property conflicts 
surrounding energy development projects.   
The following Parts propose a novel way to view the cathedral’s 
foundations.  Part II describes the canons of the international legal fields 
that impact natural resource production on indigenous land: sovereign 
rights over natural resources, the human rights regime, and the 
investment regime.  Sections A–D review how each field studies and 
defines the protection of the right to property from third-party 
interference and how the regimes resolve the clash of rights.  Part III 
looks at representative cases where the regimes clash leaving the State 
trapped in the middle.  Finally, Part IV defines how a paradigm in the 
energy academia, energy justice, creates ways of understanding the 




 35 LOCAL ENGAGEMENT WITH INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC LAW AND HUMAN RIGHTS (Ljiljana 
Biukovic & Pitman B. Potter eds., 2017); Puig, supra note 26, at 1244. 
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II.  THREE COLLIDING REGIMES: THE SOVEREIGN RIGHTS OF EXTRACTION, THE 
DUTY TO CONSULT INDIGENOUS PEOPLE, AND THE PROTECTION AND SECURITY 
OF FOREIGN INVESTORS PROPERTY 
For decades, the energy industry and disenfranchised communities 
have had a complicated relationship.36  Nevertheless, the social damage 
that energy infrastructure brings to communities was not 
internationally recognized until the 1990s.37  The 1994 executions of 
Ogoni activists in Nigeria to protect Royal Dutch/Shell’s operations 
changed the international perception of the industry.38  Soon after the 
Nigerian outcry, other cases began to see the light of public scrutiny: BP 
Amoco and Occidental Petroleum’s operations’ connection to abusive 
military forces in conflict zones; Unocal and Total’s Myanmar pipeline 
projects in partnership with government forces who condoned forced 
labor; Mobil Oil’s natural gas fields operations in the Indonesian 
province of Aceh and the forced disappearance of villagers; and Enron’s 
confabulations with local police to suppress local opposition to the 
construction of a power plant south of Bombay, India.39  The conflicts 
have always been there, but in past decades they have translated into a 
rights conflict narrative that tends to be resolved through a cost-benefit 
analysis.  
What aggravates the clash of rights is the fact that there are two 
competing false narratives.  On the one hand, there is always the 
promise from governments and companies that the investments made 
by the extractive industries will generate some trickle-down 
development in the communities.40  As such, the economic benefits to 
 
 36 HUMAN RIGHTS AND THE OIL INDUSTRY (Asbjorn Eide, Helge Ole Bergesen, & Pia 
Rudolfon Goyer eds., 2000); Ivonne Cruz, Adrian Duhalt & Pamela Lizette Cruz, Social 
Conflicts and Infrastructure Projects in Mexico, RICE UNIVERSITY’S BAKER INST. FOR PUBLIC 
POLICY 1, https://www.bakerinstitute.org/media/files/files/e7aec681/bi-report-0621
19-mex-socialconflict.pdf (last visited Sept. 25, 2019). 
 37 Geoffrey Chandler, The Responsibility of Oil Companies, in HUMAN RIGHTS AND THE OIL 
INDUSTRY, supra note 36, at 5; see also Arvind Ganesan, Human Rights, the Energy Industry, 
and the Relationship with Home Governments, in HUMAN RIGHTS AND THE OIL INDUSTRY, supra 
note 36. 
 38 Ganesan, supra note 37, at 47. 
 39 Id. at 47–48; Chandler, supra note 37, at 10–14. 
 40 See generally Sergio Puig & Gregory Shaffer, Imperfect Alternatives: Institutional 
Choice and the Reform of Investment Law, 112 AM. J. INT’L LAW 361, 371–73 (2018) 
(describing how there are three competing goals in the reform of investment treaties, 
fairness, efficiency and peace, but that they ignore assessing adequately the tradeoffs of 
each alternative); for the role by lawyers and experts in creating institutional 
frameworks supporting development goals based on economic theory but ignoring the 
real impacts on society see David Kennedy, The “Rule of Law,” Political Choice, and 
Development Common Sense, in THE NEW LAW AND ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT 95 (David M 
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the communities should outweigh the negative effects of the 
infrastructure built on their land.  On the other hand, there is the 
perception furthered by nongovernmental organizations (NGOs) that 
indigenous and local communities’ right of previous and informed 
consultation is a right to approve or reject the projects that are being 
planned by the government.41  Both are false narratives that fail to 
resolve the tensions that emerge when governments approve the 
concessions, licenses, and permits; infrastructure is built; communities 
revolt against the investor; and the State is forced to choose between 
protecting the investment or the communities.  The State decision is 
informed partly by political considerations but also by the international 
consequences attached to treaties where the government pledged to 
protect both of them.  
As the following Sections will show, the way international law 
recognizes the rights of the State to extract its natural resources and 
how international investment and human rights regimes deal with 
breaches of treaties aggravates the tension.  The three regimes have 
ultimately monetized rights violations in a way that leaves communities 
on the wrong side of the government’s cost-benefit analysis.  This 
monetization arises from the fact that the foundations of the State’s right 
to extract natural resources rely on a classical liberal and utilitarian 
view of property rights that overemphasizes the value of economic 
welfare, as opposed to recognizing community-based interest and 
multi-layered relationships that arise out of the existence of property 
rights.42  The liberal and utilitarian foundation and its focus on economic 
welfare is then replicated in the indigenous and investment regimes.  
A.  States’ Rights Over Natural Resources and their Liberal and 
Utilitarian Foundations 
The purpose of this Section is to explain how the liberal and 
utilitarian foundations of the State’s rights to extract its natural 
resources set the stage for the clash of rights between indigenous 
communities and investors.  The right to extract a hydrocarbon or to 
 
Trubeck & Alvaro Santos eds., 2006); David Kennedy, Challenging Expert Rule: The 
Politics of Global Governance, 27 SYD. L. REV. 5, 26 (2005). 
 41 See generally Anaya & Puig, supra note 20; Puig, supra note 26; Miller, supra note 
20. 
 42 Joseph William Singer, Property and Social Relations: From Title to Entitlement, in 
PROPERTY AND VALUES: ALTERNATIVES TO PUBLIC AND PRIVATE OWNERSHIP 3–4 (Charles Geisler 
& Gail Daneker eds., 2000) [hereinafter Singer, Property and Social Relations]; see also 
Joseph William Singer, Indian Title: Unraveling the Racial Context of Property Rights, or 
How to Stop Engaging in Conquest, 10 ALBANY GOV’T L. REV. 1 [hereinafter Singer, Indian 
Title]. 
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build infrastructure to transport energy products in the name of 
consumers, the State, or in general for a “public benefit” sits at the center 
of the conflicts that emerge.  These questions are not new for property 
law scholars.  There is a rich and longstanding debate among property 
law scholars on how the law deals with the tensions among individual 
property rights, the State’s powers to infringe on them for public 
benefits, and the State’s use of private parties to achieve the alleged 
social goals.43  This Article does not intend to exhaust the debate but 
rather to show how these unresolved tensions are also present in the 
international legal regimes that regulate State exploitation of mineral 
resources and the protection of property of investors and indigenous 
people.   
The unresolved debate in domestic property law reemerges at the 
international level because the State’s right to extract resources has a 
liberal and utilitarian foundation.  The way international law regulates 
the rights of the sovereign to extract resources in their territory 
aggravates the conflict that emerges when the governments also pledge 
in separate instruments to protect indigenous communities’ land and 
foreign investors’ property from third-party interference.  In many 
energy-related projects, these two pledges collide, and the State relies 
 
 43 See e.g., Jennifer Nedelsky, Should Property Be Constitutionalized? A Relational and 
Comparative Approach, in PROPERTY LAW IN THE THRESHOLD OF THE 21ST CENTURY 417, 427 
(G.E. van Maanen & A.J. van der Walt eds., 1996) (“[P]roperty implicates the very core 
issues of politics: distributive justice and the allocation of power.”); Singer, Property and 
Social Relations, supra note 42; Charles E. Cohen, Eminent Domain After JKelo v. City of 
New London: An Argument for Banning Economic Development Takings, 29 HARV. J.L. & 
PUB. POL’Y 491, 497 (2006) (“Rather than advancing the goals of efficiency and justice, 
modern eminent domain practices in the area of economic development are tainted by 
the abuse of existing property owners (particularly, but not exclusively, in the form of 
undercompensation for taken property), capture by special interests, and inefficiency.”); 
Michael A. Heller & James E. Krier, Deterrence and Distribution in the Law of Takings, 112 
HARV. L. REV. 997, 998 (1999) (“In a vast and otherwise contentious literature, whether 
judicial opinions or scholarly books and articles, there appears to be a virtual consensus 
that the purposes of just compensation are essentially two[:] . . . ‘efficiency’ and 
‘justice[]’”); Frank I. Michelman, Property, Utility, and Fairness: Comments on the Ethical 
Foundations of “Just Compensation” Law, 80 HARV. L. REV. 1165, 1173 (“[A]n ‘efficient’ 
process is one which maximizes the total amount of welfare, of personal satisfaction, in 
society, and not all satisfaction is material.”); Timothy M. Mulvaney, Property-as-Society, 
2018 WIS. L. REV. 911, 912–13 (2018) (describing how the modern regulatory takings 
disputes unmask the competing conceptions of property: property-as-liberty, property-
as-investment, and property-as-society); Eduardo M. Peñalver, Property Metaphors and 
Kelo v. New London: Two Views of the Castle, 74 FORDHAM L. REV. 2971, 2974 (2006) 
(“When owners prove unwilling or unable to sort out disagreements about . . . spillover 
effects on their own, the state [has] to make decisions about which spillover effects 
owners must tolerate and which spillover-creating actions they may not take . . . .”); 
Laura S. Underkuffler, The Politics of Property and Need, 20 CORNELL J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 363, 
370 (2010) (“No societally recognized and enforced property right, which is 
‘normatively neutral,’ actually exists.”). 
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on a cost-benefit analysis and the monetization of the property rights to 
resolve the tension.  The international regimes downplay the “public 
benefit” of the social, cultural, and spiritual connection that indigenous 
people have with their land and overemphasize the economic “benefits” 
that building energy infrastructure through private parties provides to 
the State. 
International treaties that regulate a State’s sovereign rights to 
extract its natural resources rely on a conception of property rights in 
which the emphasis is given to the land’s economic value as a means to 
achieve development.44  I argue that this conception is based on a liberal 
and utilitarian conception of property rights.  It is liberal and utilitarian 
because it serves the purpose of protecting individual freedom, 
translated as State sovereignty at the international level, and also 
promotes economic investment in the land, downplaying other 
community-based values.45  Under the liberal view, individuals are 
considered absolute within their own “castle” only subject to 
intervention in the name of a greater common good.46  International law 
treats State sovereignty over its territory and resources in a similar way 
as the liberal view treats individual property rights.  Both property 
views assume the existence of “permanent rights of absolute control” 
through the existence of the power to exclude others and “the full power 
to transfer those rights completely or partially on such terms as the 
owner may choose.”47  
The international treaties that regulate the rights of the State over 
their natural resources also have a utilitarian view because they 
conceive natural resources mainly as “tools” to advance economic 
 
 44 See generally NATURAL RESOURCES AND SUSTAINABLE DEVELOPMENT. INTERNATIONAL 
ECONOMIC LAW PERSPECTIVES (Celine Tan and Julio Faundez eds., 2017); see also Singer, 
Property and Social Relations, supra note 42, at 3–4. 
 45 Mulvaney, supra note 43, at 912.  This is what Professor Mulvaney characterizes 
the traditional conceptions of property “a libertarian view sees property as creating a 
sphere of individual freedom and control (property-as-liberty); a pecuniary view sees 
property as a tool of economic investment (property-as-investment).”  Id.  Professor 
Mulvaney also identifies a progressive view that “sees property as serving a whole host 
of evolving social goals including, but not limited to, the aforementioned goals of 
promoting freedom and encouraging economic investment (property-as-society).”  Id. 
 46 Singer, Property and Social Relations, supra note 42, at 5.  The traditional view of 
property rights has its genesis in John Locke’s philosophy on the “state of nature.”  JOHN 
LOCKE, TWO TREATISES OF GOVERNMENT §§ 30–32, 37 (Thomas Hollis ed., 1764) (ebook).  
Under his philosophy, property has the main purpose of cultivating and improvement.  
Mere possession cannot be the purpose of the title.  Following Locke’s views on the 
nature or property, it is easy to conclude that indigenous possession that does not seek 
to generate economic benefits, as it is not transferable as a property right.  Under the 
law of nature, indigenous property is rather a type of usufruct or habitation. 
 47 Singer, Property and Social Relations, supra note 42, at 5. 
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development for the greater good.48  Little attention is given to the fact 
that natural resources might serve other social values, such as cultural 
or religious heritage.49  This is particularly true for social values that do 
not conform to the heritage of the majority of the population.  
Conversely, indigenous people conceive their land and natural 
resources primarily through social, cultural, and religious relations.  
These natural resources are not means to an end; they are the essence 
of their culture.  
A liberal and utilitarian approach to property is not without 
contradictions.  On the one hand, the liberal view affirms title owners’ 
absolute right of exclusion, and on the other, the utilitarian foundation 
regulating the property of natural resources is preoccupied with the 
task of transforming the environment to create an agricultural and 
urban industrial economy.50  The State encourages economic actors to 
tame the “wilderness” and transform it for development benefit.51  In 
that process, regulation and property law are constructed and 
reconstructed to drive economic transformation forward, even above 
the right of exclusion of titleholders.52  Except for in a few circumstances, 
preservation is discouraged and rules of landownership are shaped to 
incentivize economic growth.53  
The United Nations General Assembly Resolution on Permanent 
Sovereignty Over Natural Resources of 1963 is a clear example of how 
the absolute right of exclusion and the economic drive over natural 
resources materialized internationally.54  The resolution, adopted by a 
vote of eighty-seven to two with twelve countries abstaining, recognizes 
the “inalienable right of all States freely to dispose of their natural 
wealth and resources in accordance with their national interests and in 
respect for the economic independence of the States.”55  This widely 
accepted international instrument affirms further that “natural wealth 
and resources must be exercised in the interests of their national 
 
 48 Celine Tan & Julio Faundez, Introduction, in NATURAL RESOURCES AND SUSTAINABLE 
DEVELOPMENT supra note 44 at 1–2; Joseph L. Sax, Ownership, Property, and Sustainability 
Symposium: The Challenge of Sustainability, 31 UTAH ENVTL, L. REV. 1, 4 (2011). 
 49 Singer, Property and Social Relations, supra note 42, at 5.  In the classical approach, 
the owner is identifiable “by formal title rather than by informal relations or moral 
claims.”  Id. 
 50 Sax, supra note 48, at 4. 
 51 Id. at 5. 
 52 Id. at 6. 
 53 Id. 
 54 United Nations General Assembly Resolution on Permanent Sovereignty Over 
Natural Resources, 1803 GAOR 15 (1962).  
 55 Id. 
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development and the well-being of the people.”56  The text of the 
declaration employs terms such as “exploration, development and 
disposition,” and uses “foreign capital” to achieve these goals only 
subject to the “rules and conditions” set up by the different nations.57  In 
other words, the resolution recognizes the absolute right of the State to 
exclude others, be them foreign governments or private entities, and 
exploit the natural resources in its territory for economic development.  
It is the international version of a classical and utilitarian vision of 
property rights, which puts exploitation over conservation first and 
treats property owners as absolute only subject to the limits of an 
undefined public good. 
Here is where the paradox of the property regime in the context of 
indigenous rights emerges.  For indigenous communities to exercise 
property rights against others, they must downplay their property’s 
spiritual, religious, and social value.  Instead of promoting the inclusion 
of the “others” into the benefits of their culture, communities are forced 
to argue for the exclusion of others.  Once the title is recognized, the 
communities can exclude other private owners, but they are then 
subject to the limits of the State’s public interests.58  In the name of 
“public benefits,” lands are expropriated, and communities are 
relocated.  For the sake of benefiting loosely defined social progress, 
individual or indigenous property rights cannot get in the way of the 
“social progressive view” of property rights that trumps a titleholder’s 
rights of exclusion.59  It is the State’s expansion over property rights in 
the name of public interest-oriented projects or public interest 
regulation.60  
This “social” view of the value of property tends to outbalance the 
consequences of affecting the titleholder’s individual freedom against 
the economic benefits that a particular project will bring into society.  
This restriction on the right of exclusion exists particularly in countries 
where mineral rights located in the same land belong to the 
governments, and those governments require the minerals’ extraction 
 
 56 Id. 
 57 Id. 
 58 Singer, Indian Title, supra note 42, at 27. 
 59 Mulvaney, supra note 43, at 912; see also Duncan Kennedy, Three Globalizations of 
Law and Legal Thought: 1850–2000, in THE NEW LAW AND ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT 19, 
42–43, 60 (David M Trubeck & Alvaro Santos eds., 2006) (discussing how the “social” 
progressive view fits under the second globalization of legal thought that sought to 
dismantle an over emphasis on the laissez fair, individual rights, private law, and private 
interests over the economy). 
 60 Mulvaney, supra note 43, at 912. 
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to fund social programs.61  The government agencies may then choose 
to negotiate with private third parties over the exploitation of the 
resources and award concessions, licenses, or other contractual 
schemes for that purpose.62  Companies become an “arm” of the State; 
they develop the resources on behalf of the nation in exchange for 
participation in production or profits.63  
If the State protected indigenous peoples’ communal property 
interest over other economic and social interests, i.e., energy 
consumers, the paradox would not emerge.  On the contrary, indigenous 
communities could rely on State intervention for the protection of their 
communal life.64  But the State tends to weigh the different interests and 
values protected by property rights, and in that cost-benefit analysis, 
energy infrastructure projects seem to trump communal life.65  To be 
clear, I do not argue that contemporary legal systems completely 
disregard community values.  For example, property law doctrines 
recognize public prescriptive easements and public nuisance.  Liberal 
and utilitarian conceptions of property law, however, allow societies to 
normatively deny that indigenous culture provides the same public 
benefits as national historical landmarks or environmentally sensitive 
lands.66  Few would argue that the economic benefits of building 
invasive energy infrastructure in a historical site such as Gettysburg’s 
battlefield, the Arlington National Cemetery, or the National Cathedral 
in Mexico City outweigh the loss to society.  We do, however, justify 
drilling on indigenous sacred lands in forests or the construction of 
 
 61 Garcia Sanchez, The Mexican Petroleum License of 2013, supra note 16, at 216–17; 
Guillermo J. Garcia Sanchez, A Critical Approach to International Investment Law, the 
Hydrocarbons Industry, and Its Relation to Domestic Institutions, 57 HARV. INT. LAW J. 
477–80, 490 (2016). 
 62 See generally NATURAL RESOURCES AND SUSTAINABLE DEVELOPMENT, supra note 44; 
Garcia Sanchez, The Mexican Petroleum License of 2013, supra note 16; Garcia Sanchez, 
A Critical Approach, supra note 61 at 477–80. 
 63 Garcia Sanchez, The Mexican Petroleum License of 2013, supra note 16, at 219–20. 
 64 See Singer, Indian Title, supra note 42, at 30.  Joseph Singer’s proposal to solve the 
paradox is to limit the eminent domain powers of the State.  While the state in general 
is free to take fee simple property for public use with just compensation, what could 
protect the communities is a title that allows the State to obtain tribal lands only with 
tribal consent.  
 65 See id. at 32.  Singer’s Johnson case interpretation has a dual protection: “[T]he 
United States has a right of first refusal to tribal lands.  That means that the tribe cannot 
transfer fee simple title to anyone other than the United States and that the United States 
cannot acquire tribal title without the voluntary consent of the tribe.”  Id. 
 66 Contemporary legal systems, particularly in the U.S., do recognize that there are 
properties that are immune from eminent domain, but the question is whether 
indigenous lands should also be awarded the same treatment.  
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pipelines on tribal burial grounds as providing substantive energy 
benefits for the State or consumers.  
B.  The International Rights of Indigenous People and the Tensions 
with States’ Sovereign Rights over Natural Resources 
International treaties and resolutions on indigenous people’s 
rights have mitigated the way the State exercises its sovereignty over 
their land, culture, and social relations.67  There is a rich literature 
discussing the importance and effectiveness of the indigenous-rights 
treaties, conventions, and resolutions.68  The literature tends to focus on 
the processes of implementing the rights of indigenous people to receive 
prior, free, and informed consultation for any development project in 
their land.69  This Article, however, moves the debate to the perspective 
of the State that has a sovereign right to exploit natural resources in the 
name of progress.  A liberal and utilitarian view of property law that 
diminishes the value of indigenous cultural, spiritual, and social 
connection to resources influences the international norms that 
regulate the State’s sovereign rights to exploit them.  The liberal and 
utilitarian view is so prevalent that it is replicated in other international 
instruments that converge around energy projects.  
For example, the same international conventions that recognize 
indigenous communities’ rights and important cultural value to 
humanity affirm that, when it comes to natural resources and the State’s 
right to extract them, the only protection left to indigenous communities 
is the right to be consulted.  These conventions also reaffirm the 
monetization of the property by requiring the State to integrate them in 
the economic benefits of the extraction.  When placed in a balance, the 
social, cultural, and spiritual connections to the land are forcefully 




 67 See generally PATRICK MACKLEM, THE SOVEREIGNTY OF HUMAN RIGHTS (Oxford 
University Press, 1st ed. 2015); Anaya & Puig, supra note 20; James Anaya, Promotion 
and Protection of All Human Rights, Civil, Political, Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, 
Including the Right to Development, U.N. Doc. A/HRC/12/34, (July 15, 2009) (explaining 
the origins and scope of the duty of states to consult, as written by the Special 
Rapporteur on the Situation of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms of Indigenous 
People) [hereinafter Anaya, Promotion and Protection of All Human Rights];. 
 68 See generally Anaya & Puig, supra note 20; Anaya, Promotion and Protection of All 
Human Rights, supra note 67; MACKLEM, supra note 67.  
 69 See generally Anaya & Puig, supra note 20; Anaya, Promotion and Protection of All 
Human Rights, supra note 67; MACKLEM, supra note 67. 
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The right to consultation is enshrined in international instruments, 
mainly the United Nations General Assembly Declaration of Indigenous 
Rights of 2007 (“UN Indigenous Rights Declaration”)70 and Convention 
169 of the International Labor Organization of 1989 (“ILO Convention 
169”).71  The preamble of the ILO Convention 169 recognizes “the 
aspirations of [indigenous and tribal] peoples to exercise control over 
their own institutions, ways of life and economic development and to 
maintain and develop their identities, languages and religions, within 
the framework of the States in which they live.”72  The preamble also 
recognizes “the distinctive contributions of indigenous and tribal 
peoples to the cultural diversity and social and ecological harmony of 
humankind and to international co-operation and understanding.”73  
The Convention then recognizes the responsibility of the State to 
“respect the special importance for the cultures and spiritual values of 
the peoples concerned of their relationship with the lands or 
territories.”74  There is a clear recognition that indigenous people have 
a unique relationship with the land and natural resources.  The ILO 
Convention 169, however, also recognizes that the State can exploit the 
same resources, and that international law does not recognize a right to 
oppose such a development.75  Article 15 of the ILO Convention 169 
provides:  
In cases in which the State retains the ownership of mineral or 
sub-surface resources or rights to other resources pertaining to 
lands, governments shall establish or maintain procedures 
through which they shall consult these peoples, with a view to 
ascertaining whether and to what degree their interests 
would be prejudiced, before undertaking or permitting any 
programmes for the exploration or exploitation of such 
resources pertaining to their lands.76   
The right to be consulted and the duty of the State to evaluate the 
impact do not translate to a right to veto or oppose the project.  This is 
even clearer when the same article adds that the “peoples concerned 
 
 70 A majority of 144 States voted in favor, 4 voted against (Australia, Canada, New 
Zealand and the United States), and 11 states abstained (Azerbaijan, Bangladesh, 
Bhutan, Burundi, Colombia, Georgia, Kenya, Nigeria, Russian Federation, Samoa and 
Ukraine).  See G.A. Res. 61/295 (Oct. 2, 2007) [hereinafter UN Indigenous Rights 
Declaration]. 
 71 United Nations, Indigenous and Tribal Peoples Convention (No. 169), June 27, 
1989, 72 ILO Official Bull. 59 [hereinafter ILO Convention 169]. 
 72 Id. 
 73 Id. 
 74 Id. 
 75 See Anaya & Puig, supra note 20, at 435–36. 
 76 ILO Convention 169, supra note 71, at art. 15 (emphasis added). 
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shall wherever possible participate in the benefits of such activities, and 
shall receive fair compensation for any damages which they may sustain 
as a result of such activities.”77 
The same principle is recognized in Article 32 of the UN Indigenous 
Rights Declaration, where it provides:  
States shall consult and cooperate in good faith with the 
indigenous peoples . . . in order to obtain their free and 
informed consent prior to the approval of any project affecting 
their lands and territories and other resources, particularly in 
connection with the development, utilization or exploitation 
of mineral, water, or other resources.78 
In case the project proceeds, “[s]tates shall provide effective 
mechanisms for just and fair redress for any such activities, and 
appropriate measures shall be taken to mitigate adverse environmental, 
economic, social, cultural or spiritual impact.”79  Additionally, Article 28 
of the UN Indigenous Rights Declaration sets the “right to redress, by 
means that can include restitution or, when this is not possible, just, fair 
and equitable compensation, for the lands, territories and resources . . . 
which have been confiscated, taken, occupied, used or damaged without 
their free, prior and informed consent.”80 
Hence, the system both recognizes the spiritual, social, and 
religious connection of the indigenous people to the land and the State’s 
rights to exploit the mineral resources when needed, subject to “just, fair 
and equitable compensation.”81  Again, indigenous property is treated 
as any other right being affected by a public purpose is treated, and the 
definition of what is to be considered a public benefit depends on 
government officials and their normative commitments.  When push 
comes to shove, the economic benefits of contracting with private 
parties to develop natural resources on behalf of the State supersedes 
the interests of indigenous communities.  At that point, the State’s only 
duty is to mitigate the damages and compensate the communities with 
some economic benefit. 
  
 
 77 Id. 
 78 UN Indigenous Rights Declaration, supra note 70, at art. 32.  
 79 Id. 
 80 UN Indigenous Rights Declaration, supra note 70, at art. 28. (emphasis added) 
 81 See id. 
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1.  Indigenous Communities’ Rights of Consultation and the 
Inter-American System of Human Rights 
As explained further below, the Inter-American Court of Human 
Rights (IACtHR), sitting in San Jose, Costa Rica, has extensively 
developed the rights of indigenous people.  Yet its jurisprudence, to my 
view, has not addressed the issue in a way that fully dissuades State 
preference for a solution based on a cost-benefit analysis.  
The IACtHR cases involving indigenous communities can be 
divided into three categories.82  The first involves aggressions against 
the communities that range from murders of activists to massacres of 
entire villages.83  Most of these cases happened in contexts of internal 
civil wars (Guatemala), military operations against drug cartels 
 
 82 There is one case involving electoral processes in which an indigenous activist 
wanted to run for local government but was denied access to the ballot, since he did not 
belong to any political party.  Since this is only one case in the docket, I do not treat it as 
a category in itself.  See YATAMA v. Nicaragua, Preliminary Objections, Merits, 
Reparations and Costs, Judgment, Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. C) No. 127 (June 23, 2005). 
 83 See Acosta y Otros v. Nicaragua [Acosta et al. v. Nicaragua], Preliminary Objections, 
Background, Reparations and Costs, Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. C) No. 334 (Mar. 25, 2017) 
(involving the murder of an activist involved in the defense of the ancestral lands of his 
community); Miembros de la Aldea Chichupac y comunidades vecinas del Municipio de 
Rabinal v. Guatemala [Members of the Village of Chichupac and Neighboring Cmtys. of 
Rabinal v. Guatemala], Preliminary Objections, Merits, Reparations and Costs, Inter-Am. 
Ct. H.R. (ser. C) No. 328 (Nov. 30, 2016) (involving the massacre of 32 indigenous people 
in 1982 during the civil war); Tiu Tojin v. Guatemala, Merits, Reparations, and Costs, 
Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. C) No. 190 (Nov. 26, 2008) (involving the forced disappearance 
of an indigenous activist and her newborn daughter  during the civil war in Guatemala 
in 1990); Chitay Nech et al. v. Guatemala, Preliminary Objections, Merits, Reparations, 
and Costs, Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. C) No. 212 (May 25, 2010) (involving the forced 
disappearance of an indigenous local municipal authority during the civil war in 
Guatemala in 1990); Gudiel Álvarez et al (“Diario Militar”) v. Guatemala, Merits, 
Reparations and Costs, Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. C) No. 262 (Nov. 20, 2012) (involving 
several massacres and extrajudicial killings of indigenous communities between 1980 
and 1982 during the Guatemalan Civil War); Escué-Zapata v. Colombia, Merits, 
Reparations and Costs, Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. C) No. 165 (July 4, 2007) (involving the 
extrajudicial killing of the leader of an indigenous community by the Colombian army in 
1988); Rosendo Cantú et al. v. México, Preliminary Objections, Merits, Reparations and 
Costs, Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. C) No. 216 (Aug. 31, 2010) (involving the sexual assault of 
an indigenous woman by the Mexican army during anti-drug trafficking operations by 
the military in Guerrero); Fernández Ortega et al. v. México, Preliminary Objections, 
Merits, Reparations, and Costs, Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. C) No. 215 (Aug. 30, 2010) 
(involving the sexual assault of an indigenous woman by the Mexican army during anti-
drug trafficking operations by the military in Guerrero); Moiwana Cmty. v. Suriname, 
Preliminary Objections, Merits, Reparations and Costs, Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. C) No. 124 
(June 15, 2005) (involving the massacre and forced displacement of an afro-indigenous 
community in Suriname in 1986); Masacre Plan de Sanchez v. Guatemala, Merits, Inter-
Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. C) No. 105 (April 29, 2004) (involving a military operation to eradicate 
guerilla insurgents and the communities supporting them). 
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(Mexico), or guerilla activities (Colombia).84  Some of the aggressions 
forced the communities to abandon their ancestral lands, and they have 
not recovered them since.85  Nevertheless, the main claim in the cases 
had to do with acts of aggression and the lack of effective judicial 
proceedings to investigate human rights violations claims.  In these 
cases, the IACtHR has mainly focused on the lack of judicial response to 
adequately prosecute human rights violations against communities.86  
This focus is partly because government officers were involved, and 
partly that indigenous communities’ claims are not taken seriously in 
these jurisdictions.  Consequently, the communities’ right to effective 
judicial protection was ignored.  
The second group of cases involves the lack of State administrative 
and/or judicial proceedings to take care of property or title claims from 
indigenous communities.87  In the majority of these cases, third parties 
displaced the communities due to the lack of titles regarding their 
 
 84 See Acosta, Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. C) No. 334, ¶ 33; Members of the Village of 
Chichupac and Neighboring Cmtys., Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. C) No. 328, ¶ 60; Tiu Tojin, 
Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. C) No. 190, ¶ 40; Chitay Nech,  Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. C) No. 212, 
¶ 27; Gudiel Álvarez, Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. C) No. 262, ¶ 33; Rosendo Cantú, Inter-Am. 
Ct. H.R. (ser. C) No. 216, ⁋ 138; Moiwana Cmty., Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. C) No. 124, ¶ 3, 
Masacre Plan de Sanchez, Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. C) No. 105, ¶¶ 42.5–42.6. 
 85 See, e.g., Acosta, Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. C) No. 334; Members of the Village of 
Chichupac and Neighboring Cmtys., Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. C) No. 328; Tiu Tojin, Inter-
Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. C) No. 190; Chitay Nech, Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. C) No. 212; Gudiel 
Álvarez, Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. C) No. 262; Escué-Zapata, Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. C) 
No. 262; Rosendo Cantú, Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. C) No. 216; Fernández Ortega, Inter-Am. 
Ct. H.R. (ser. C) No. 215; Moiwana Cmty., Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. C) No. 124. 
 86 See Acosta, Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. C) No. 334; Members of the Village of Chichupac 
and Neighboring Cmtys., Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. C) No. 328; Tiu Tojin, Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. 
(ser. C) No. 190; Chitay Nech, Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. C) No. 212; Gudiel Álvarez, Inter-
Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. C) No. 262; Escué-Zapata, Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. C) No. 262; Rosendo 
Cantú, Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. C) No. 216; Fernández Ortega, Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. C) 
No. 215; Moiwana Cmty., Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. C) No. 124.  
 87 See Sawhoyamaxa Indigenous Cmty v. Paraguay, Merits, Reparations and Costs, 
Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. C) No. 146, (Mar. 29, 2006); Yakye Axa Indigenous Cmty v. 
Paraguay, Merits, Reparations and Costs, Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. C) No. 125, ¶¶ 102, 103, 
215, 217, 225 (June 17, 2005); Mayagna (Sumo) Awas Tingni Cmty. v. Nicaragua, Merits, 
Reparations and Costs, Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. C) No. 79, ¶¶ 123–24, 127, 137–38 (Aug. 
31, 2001); Saramaka People v. Suriname, Preliminary Objections, Merits, Reparations, 
and Costs, Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. C) No. 172, ¶¶ 1, 91, 107, 110, 115–16, 194 (Nov. 28, 
2007); Kichwa Indigenous People of Sarayaku v. Ecuador, Merits and Reparations, Inter-
Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. C) No. 245, ¶ 171 (June 27, 2012) [hereinafter Sarayaku Merits and 
Reparations]; Moiwana Cmty., Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. C) No. 124, ¶ 209; Xákmok Kásek 
Indigenous Cmty. v. Paraguay, Merits, Reparations and Costs, Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. C) 
No. 214, ¶¶ 154, 210, 281 (Aug. 24, 2010); Kuna Indigenous People of Madungandí and 
the Emberá Indigenous People of Bayano v. Panama, Preliminary Objections, Merits, 
Reparations and Costs, Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. C) No. 284, ¶¶ 152, 157–58, 160, 166 (Oct. 
14, 2014). 
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ancestral lands.88  In these decisions, the IACtHR has ordered the States 
to create a system that processes the communities’ land claims and is 
tailored according to their social, cultural, and language barriers, as well 
as regional necessities.89  The development of these groups of cases 
reinforces the idea that indigenous communities have a right to assert 
full title rights in their lands, and for that purpose, there must be a 
process for them to acquire title.90 
Finally, the third category of cases involves the right of indigenous 
communities to be consulted regarding any development project (e.g., a 
hydroelectric dam in Panama) or investment made in their lands or that 
could have an impact in their territories (e.g., oil and gas fields in 
Ecuador, mining concessions in Suriname, lumber extraction in 
Nicaragua).91  Naturally, some of these cases also connect with the first 
and second categories because they involve aggression from local 
authorities when the communities protest against the development 
projects or when the right of consultation has not been respected due to 
the impossibility of determining the communities’ title to the land.92  
These types of cases are relevant for the future of energy-related 
projects in the region.  The way the IACtHR interprets the rights of 
indigenous people to have their ancestral rights recognized and to be 
consulted is relevant for States’ decision-making processes, in which 
they must balance the different interests and goals involved in energy 
projects.  
According to the IACtHR, the State’s first responsibility is to 
establish an effective proceeding domestically that allows the 
communities a “delimitation, demarcation, and titling of indigenous 
community lands.”93  Then, the IACtHR connects this proceeding to the 
right to receive protection from the State regarding property rights.94  
 
 88 Xákmok Kásek Indigenous Cmty., Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. C) No. 214 at ¶¶ 154, 310. 
 89 Yakye Axa Indigenous Cmty., Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. C) No. 125 at ¶ 63; Tiu Tojin, 
Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. C) No. 190 at ¶ 96; Xákmok Kásek Indigenous Cmty., Inter-Am. Ct. 
H.R. (ser. C) No. 214 at ¶ 270; Rosendo Cantú, Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. C) No. 216 at ¶ 184; 
Sarayaku Merits and Reparations, supra note 87, at ¶ 264. 
 90 See Saramaka People, Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. C) No. 172 at ¶¶ 172, 174–75, 194c. 
 91 Id. at ¶ 194d; Sarayaku Merits and Reparations, supra note 87, at ¶¶ 227, 301. 
 92 See, e.g., Acosta, Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. C) No. 334 (involving an activist who was 
murdered after protesting and initiating judicial and administrative proceedings for the 
recognition of ancestral lands now being occupied by Greek and American real-estate 
developers); Sarayaku Merits and Reparations, supra note 87 (finding the Sarayaku 
community blocked the entrance to the oil fields and, on several occasions, attacked 
workers of the oil company; in exchange, the State used the police, which, on several 
occasions, used excessive force). 
 93 See Mayagna (Sumo) Awas Tingni Cmty., Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. C) No. 79 at ¶ 137. 
 94 Id at ¶¶ 142–55. 
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Article 21 of the American Convention of Human Rights (“American 
Convention”) follows the liberal and utilitarian tenets of property rights 
by declaring that “no one shall be deprived of his property except upon 
payment of just compensation, for reasons of public utility or social 
interests, and in the cases and according to the form established by 
law.”95  Moreover, it expands the liberal and utilitarian view that the 
essence of property rights is to exclude others from interfering in the 
owners’ enjoyment by declaring that “everyone has the right to the use 
and enjoyment of its property.”96  The only exception is legislation that 
“may subordinate such use and enjoyment to the interests of society.”97  
Consequently, the Convention recognizes that there is no absolute right 
of exclusion or immune property rights from the use of eminent domain 
for public purposes.98  It is from this traditional premise of the liberal 
and utilitarian view of property rights that the IACtHR has developed its 
jurisprudence.  
According to the IACtHR’s jurisprudence, and just like any other 
property right recognized by the American Convention, indigenous 
people and tribal people must receive guarantees of effective and equal 
exercise of their rights over the territories that they have traditionally 
occupied.99  Briefly, occupation of tribal lands must be equalized to a 
private property right through an effective proceeding established by 
the State.100  And as such, just like any other private right, it must be 
protected by the State from third-party interference, subject only to 
limits imposed by the State for the benefit of the public interest.  The 
textual protection provided by the American Convention is thus the 
protection of a property right in the most liberal way possible.  
 
 
 95 Organization of American States, American Convention on Human Rights, “Pact of 
San José, Costa Rica,” 1144 U.N.T.S. 144, 150 (Nov. 22, 1969) [hereinafter American 
Convention]. 
 96 Id. 
 97 Id. 
 98 Hence, the Convention does not recognize the social, cultural and religious values 
that emerge from property rights and that cannot be replaced by commentary 
compensations.  The basis of property rights in the Convention is the exclusion of others 
first, and then a few exceptions for public purposes, including the payment of just 
compensations for reasons of public interests.  This right follows very closely the 
drafting of the Fifth Amendment of the U.S. Constitution.  U.S. CONST. amend V, § 1 (“No 
person shall be . . . deprived of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law; nor 
shall private property be taken for public use, without just compensation.”). 
 99 Saramaka People v. Suriname, Preliminary Objections, Merits, Reparations, and 
Costs, Judgment, Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. C) No. 172, ¶ 91 (Nov. 28, 2007); see also 
Sarayaku Merits and Reparations, supra note 87, at ¶ 171. 
 100 Saramaka People, Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. C) No. 172 at ¶ 116. 
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The liberal and utilitarian conceptions of property rights contrast 
with indigenous communities’ expectations that international treaties 
provide them with the right to halt the investment if they do not want to 
give their consent.101  Specifically, false expectations are created after 
obtaining title to their land, and then communities revolt against the 
companies, blocking access to the energy-related projects and, in some 
instances, exercising violence against the operators and local 
authorities in the region.102  Out of the revolt against the projects, 
another international duty by the State is breached: the right of foreign 
investors to receive full protection and security.  As the following 
Section explains, the two international obligations collide in the 
development of energy infrastructure projects. 
C.  The Duty to Protect Foreign Investors from Third-Party 
Interference 
Bilateral Investment Treaties (BITs) or sections of Free Trade 
Agreements, such as Chapter XI of NAFTA, give special protection rights 
to foreign investors against government intervention.103  These treaties 
give foreign investors the right to bring international claims against 
States in arbitral tribunals when they are being treated unfairly, in a 
discriminatory way, or when they have not received full protection and 
security.104  In case the State does not respect these rights and is found 
in breach of its treaty obligations, companies can receive compensation 
for their losses.105  In other words, these treaties also reinforce the 
liberal and utilitarian conception of private property.  
Hence, whether there is a clash between the rights of consultation 
and of foreign investment due to the false narratives described above, 
the State has no option but to weigh the consequences of siding with one 
or the other protected interest.  And this comes down to a monetary 
calculation.  In some cases, the government might even end up paying 
the foreign investors and the communities.  Paradoxically, the State ends 
up compensating indigenous communities because it did not protect 
 
 101 See infra Sections III.A and III.B for examples.  
 102 Id. 
 103 According to the United Nations Conference on Trade and Development 
(UNCTAD), there are 2,336 BITS in force and 323 Treaties with Investment Provisions 
in force globally.  See North American Free Trade Agreement, Can.-Mex.-U.S., Dec. 17, 
1992, 32 I.L.M. 605 (1993); International Investment Agreements Navigator, UNCTAD 
INVESTMENT POLICY HUB, https://investmentpolicy.unctad.org/international-investment-
agreements (last visited Mar 3, 2021); North American Free Trade Agreement, 32 ILM 
605, (1993). 
 104 Garcia Sanchez, A Critical Approach, supra note 61, at 481–83. 
 105 Id. at 518–25. 
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them against the interference with their lands, while also paying the 
international company for not protecting it against the indigenous 
communities’ unrest affecting their investment plans.106  
1.  International Investment Treaties and the Rights to 
Receive Full Protection and Security of Foreign Direct 
Investments 
The full protection and security standard is one of the oldest 
obligations in international investment law.  Along with the fair and 
equitable principle, this standard has been present in international 
treaties since the time of the signing of the Friendship, Commerce and 
Navigation (FCN) treaties of the nineteenth and twentieth centuries.107  
As an example of the type of clause included in those treaties, Article 3 
of the FCN treaty between Brunei and the United States of 1850 states 
that “[c]itizens of the United States of America shall as far as lies within 
[Brunei’s] power, within his dominions, enjoy full and complete 
protection and security for themselves and for any property which they 
may acquire . . . .”108 
In these early international instruments, the standard was included 
alongside the fair and equitable treatment principle.  The combination 
of both principles, together with the national treatment standard, was 
considered to compose the “minimum standard of treatment of aliens” 
prescribed by public international law.109  To grant investors full 
protection and security, in essence, means that the State is obligated to 
take active measures to protect international investment from adverse 
effects.  The State can inflict these adverse effects as a general policy, by 
its organs, or through third parties, such as indigenous communities.110 
 
 106 See discussion of Burlington Resources infra at Part II.C.2.  
 107 Take, for example, the FCN treaty between Mexico and the Dominican Republic of 
1890 or the FCN between Venezuela and Italy of 1881, both of which include the same 
standard of full protection and security.  Treaty of Friendship, Commerce and 
Navigation, Dom. Rep.-Mex., art. III, Mar. 29, 1890; Treaty of Friendship, Commerce and 
Navigation, It.-Venez., art. IV, Sept. 20, 1862.  
 108 Treaty of Peace, Friendship, Commerce and Navigation, Brunei-U.S., June 23, 
1850, 10 Stat. 909; Treaty Series 33, quoted in Suez, Sociedad General de Aguas de 
Barcelona S.A. v. Argentine Republic, ICSID Case No. ARB/03/19, Decision on Liability, 
¶ 161 (July 30, 2010) (emphasis added). 
 109 RUDOLPH DOLZER & MARGARET STEVENS, BILATERAL INVESTMENT TREATIES 61 (Martinus 
Nijhoff Publishers, 1995); see also Kenneth J. Vandevelde, The Bilateral Investment 
Treaty Program of the United States, 21 CORNELL INT’L L.J. 201, 203–04 (1988); Robert R. 
Wilson, Property-Protection Provisions in United States Commercial Treaties, 45 AM. J. 
INT’L L. 83, 92–96 (1951).  
 110 DOLZER & SCHREUER, supra note 27, at 150–52. 
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International investment tribunals have confirmed such an 
approach in several cases.111  The traditional interpretation of the 
standard calls for a pure physical protection and an obligation of due 
diligence from acts originated from State organs or third parties.112  This 
first generation was distinctive and essential for this Article because it 
involved cases of social unrest and situations of armed conflict that 
directly affected the investors’ interests in the host State.113  Moreover, 
 
 111 International Tribunals and Courts have faced different disputes where these 
harms have been alleged.  These decisions are not binding precedents, but they have 
interpretive value that has been ignored by both tribunals and academia.  For a 
discussion on how international investment tribunals use precedents to build a 
“common law” that is not recognized in treaties see generally CHESTER BROWN, A COMMON 
LAW OF INTERNATIONAL ADJUDICATION (2007). 
 112 Elettronica Sicula, SpA (ELSI) (U.S. v. It.), Judgment, 1989 I.C.J. 15, ¶ 108 (July 20).  
ELSI is one of the first recorded resolutions on the full protection and security standard 
rendered by the International Court of Justice (ICJ).  On that occasion, an American 
company located in the city of Palermo was requisitioned by the local government and 
taken over by its workers.  The United States government presented a claim against Italy 
for the violation of the U.S.-Italy FCN treaty.  The ICJ in its decision stated that the 
standard did not warrant protection in all circumstances.  In the words of the ICJ, “[T]he 
provision of ‘constant protection and security’ cannot be construed as the giving of a 
warranty that property shall never in any circumstances be occupied or disturbed.”  Id. 
 113 Asian Agric. Prod. Ltd. (AAPL) v. Sri Lanka, ICSID Case No. ARB/87/3, Final Award, 
¶¶ 45–50 (June 27, 1990).  The ELSI interpretation was confirmed by the AAPL tribunal.  
On that occasion, as a consequence of counter-insurgency operations, the government’s 
military forces destroyed the company’s complex.  The claimant argued that the 
existence of the words “enjoy” and “full” made the treaty’s standard one of strict liability 
that required the State to “achieve a result.”  The tribunal rejected this claim by arguing 
that the words’ inclusion did not elevate the standard to another type of liability distinct 
from the one construed by the traditional view of due diligence; see also Am. Mfg. & 
Trading Inc. (AMT) v. Republic of Zaire, ICSID Case No. ARB/93/1, Award, ¶¶  6.05–6.10, 
(Feb. 21, 1997).  After the AAPL’s interpretation was reaffirmed by the AMT tribunal.  
The AMT resolved a dispute between an American investor and the government of Zaire.  
In this case, another American company brought claims arising out of episodes of looting 
in which soldiers of the State armed forces destroyed, damaged or stole the investors’ 
property.  The looting happened in the context of constant riots and insurrection in the 
early 1990s in Zaire.  The tribunal decided that the obligations “incumbent upon Zaire 
is an obligation of vigilance.”  Id.  As such, the investor had the right to receive “all 
measures necessary to ensure the full enjoyment of protection and security of its 
investment.”  Id.  The tribunal even recognized that the State could not “invoke its own 
legislation to detract from any such obligation.”  Id.  On that occasion, the Republic of 
Zaire argued that it did not afford a different treatment to AMT in comparison to the one 
given to its own nationals and to foreign companies in the context of riots and 
insurrections.  Furthermore, the government argued that national legislation had 
exonerated the State from any liability.  The tribunal further concluded that the State 
must take all necessary actions to prevent the incident regardless of how it acted 
regarding its own population or other States.  In this sense, the AMT tribunal seems to 
have elevated the standard to a stricter one.  A well-administered State in the same 
circumstances could have been found equally guilty of the omission.  The tribunal 
required additional protection for this investor than that afforded to its own nationals 
or other parties.  See also Wena Hotels Ltd. v. Arab Republic of Egypt, ICSID Case No. 
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these cases included instances where the arbitrators had to discuss the 
role of governments in preventing actions taken by third parties and 
compare them to similar government acts taken to protect other actors, 
such as local populations.114  Nevertheless, as time has passed and 
 
ARB/98/4, Award, ¶¶ 82–85 (Dec. 8, 2000).  The tribunal in Wena found that in light of 
the seizure of the hotel’s premises by its workers union (EHC), there was “substantial 
evidence that . . . Egypt was aware of EHC’s intentions to seize the hotels and took no 
actions to prevent EHC from doing so.”  Id.  Moreover, once the seizures occurred, both 
the police and the Ministry of Tourism took no immediate action to restore the hotels 
promptly to Wena’s control.  Id.  Finally, Egypt never imposed substantial sanctions on 
EHC or its senior officials, suggesting Egypt’s approval of EHC’s actions.  Id.  As such, the 
tribunal found a violation of the standard in the lack of actions from State action 
notwithstanding the absence of any evidence that it fostered the intervention directly.  
Id. 
 114 Wena Hotels Ltd., ICSID Case No. ARB/98/4, Award, ¶¶ 82–85; Tecnicas 
Medioambientales TECMED S.A. v. United Mexican States, ICSID Case No. 
ARB(AF)/00/02, Award, ¶¶ 175–77 (May 29, 2003).  TECMED is another case in which 
uncontrolled social protests against the investor were alleged as constituting a violation 
of the full protection and security standard.  The TECMED tribunal had to decide 
whether the lack of action from the State to stop social demonstrations and disturbances 
at the investor’s premises amounted to a violation of the standard.  Id.  The tribunal 
found that there was no evidence that the State contributed, encouraged or fostered the 
events that affected the investment.  Id.  In order for the tribunal to find the State guilty 
of violating the standard, it was essential to find evidence “supporting the allegation that 
the Mexican authorities, whether municipal, State, or federal, have not reacted 
reasonably, in accordance with the parameters inherent in a democratic state, to the 
direct action movements.”  Id.  See also Nobel Ventures Inc. v. Romania, ICSID Case No. 
ARB/01/11, Award, ¶¶ 164–66 (Oct. 12, 2005).  The same situation of social unrest 
presented itself in the case between the company Nobel Ventures Inc. and the 
government of Romania.  After several labor protests in the city of Resita, the premises 
of the company were repeatedly occupied and damaged.  Due to the similarities between 
the ELSI case and the case at hand, the tribunal used the ICJ criteria and dismissed the 
claims presented by the investor.  Id.  Some tribunals have even been asked to decide 
whether harassment from State officials could be considered as a violation of the 
standard.  See Eureko BV v. Poland, UNCITRAL, Partial Award, ¶ 236–37 (Aug. 19, 2005) 
(involving dispute that rested in the harassment inflicted by Polish State negotiators 
upon Netherlands based company’s representatives).  In Eureko, the tribunal found that, 
although there was no evidence that the State as a whole was the instigator, if the 
“actions were to be repeated and sustained, it may be that the responsibility of the 
Government of Poland would be incurred by a failure to prevent them.”  Id.  More recent 
decisions have involved situations in which robbery and personal attacks have been 
committed.  See GEA Group Aktiengesellschaft v. Ukraine, ICSID Case No. ARB/08/16, 
Award, ¶¶ 239–67 (March 31, 2011) (confronting three actions that the claimant 
considered as a violation of the standard: unpunished theft of GEA’s products, the lack 
of response from Ukraine in a shooting of GEA’s representative, and the 
misrepresentations in certain negotiations of an individual from the Ukrainian partner 
of GEA).  In its resolution, the tribunal found that the failure to present criminal 
complaints at the time of the robberies proved that GEA did not consider them as grave 
enough to request an intervention from the State.  Id.  Regarding the second allegation, 
the tribunal found that there were some investigations initiated by the State to find the 
responsible individual of the shooting, and as such there was nothing else that the State 
could be expected to do.  Id.  Finally, the tribunals found that the claimant failed to prove 
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international investment tribunals have begun to interpret it, the 
original essence of the standard has evolved to a point that it can even 
be confused with other standards.115 
The new interpretation says that the protection must include the 
legal framework in force at the time that the investment was made.116  
The argument is twofold: some investments cannot receive physical 
protection, like contractual rights, and the only way to protect certain 
investments is through legal instruments.  As such, the standard has 
evolved to resemble one related to the investor’s legitimate 
expectations at the time of investing.117  The danger of that tendency is 
that it can almost make the standard equal to a stabilization clause.  It is 
up to the tribunals to decide which approach to take.  For this Article, 
however, as the analysis below shows, the principle continues to entail 
the protection of physical infrastructure of foreign investors from third-
party interference.  
 
that Ukraine was responsible or that it could have initiated some actions to prevent the 
misrepresentations of the Ukrainian company representative.  Id. 
 115 This very early origin and its interpretation as part of the minimum standard has 
made the principle a difficult element to distinguish from the other standards, 
particularly the fair and equitable treatment standard.  Many tribunals, when analyzing 
fair and equitable treatment, have been forced to enter into a discussion of full 
protection and security, and it seems at some points that the essence of the principles 
get mixed.  This mixture has led some scholars to believe that in today’s modern bilateral 
treaties, the standard cannot be envisaged independently.  According to Margarete 
Stevens and Rudolph Dolzer, the principle was included in “less detailed” treaties in the 
first half of the XIX century and then was passed on into today’s bilateral investment 
treaties without analyzing its scope or meaning according to the new investment 
realities.  DOLZER & STEVENS, supra note 109, at 60–61; see also Vandevelde, supra note 
109, at 204; Wilson, supra note 109, at 92–96. 
 116 Total SA v Argentine Republic, ICSID Case No. ARB/04/1, Decision on Liability 
(Dec., 27 2010), ¶ 121–22 (arguing that “a claim to stability can be based on the 
inherently prospective nature of the regulation at issue aimed at providing a defined 
framework for future operations.  This is the case for regimes, which are applicable to 
long-term investments and operations, and/or providing for ‘fall backs’ or contingent 
rights in case the relevant framework would be changes in unforeseen circumstances or 
in case certain listed events materialize. . . .  This is the case for capital intensive and 
long-term investment and operations of utilities under a license, natural resources 
exploration and exploitation, project financing or Build Operate and Transfer schemes.  
The concept of ‘regulatory fairness’ or ‘regulatory certainty’ has been used in this 
respect”).  
 117 Id.; see also Enron Creditors Recovery Corporation (formerly Enron Corporation) 
and Ponderosa Assets, LP v. Argentine Republic, ICSID Case No ARB/01/3, Award (22 
May 2007), ¶ 262 (In the context of a renewable electricity plant that required a number 
of years to be in operation so that the investor could benefit from the capital expenses, 
the tribunal argued, “[W]hat seems to be essential . . . is that these expectations derived 
from the conditions that were offered by the State to the investor at the time of the 
investment and that such conditions were relied upon by the investor when deciding to 
invest.”). 
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Notwithstanding the differences between physical and intangible 
protection, there is a doctrinal consensus, supported by case law, that 
the standard is one of due diligence.118  States are not obliged to provide 
protections that will cover any type of damage.119  The liability is not 
considered strict.120  Rather, States are under the obligation to act as any 
reasonable government would act in the same circumstances.121  
In defining the extent and content of “due diligence,” leading 
commentators, such as Professor Freeman, have found that it should be 
measured as what a “well-administered government would be expected 
to exercise in similar circumstances.”122  Professor Freeman’s formula 
has been replicated by investment tribunals and defined as an 
“objective” standard of vigilance that could be “legitimately expected” 
from a “reasonably well-organized modern State.”123  
The United Nations Conference on Trade and Development 
(UNCTAD), after analyzing some resolved cases from international 
investment tribunals, described the full protection and security 
standard in the following terms: 
[W]hile not an obligation of result, an obligation of good faith 
efforts to protect the foreign-owned property has been 
established by these recent cases, without special regard for 
the resources available to do so.  This has been referred to as 
a standard of ‘due diligence’ on the part of the host country.  
As a result, this standard should be understood as being very 
much a ‘living’ one.  It places a clear premium on political 
stability, and the obligation of host countries to ensure that 
any instability does not have negative effects on foreign 





 118 DOLZER & SCHREUER, supra note 27, at 149–53; see also IAN BROWNLIE, PRINCIPLES OF 
INTERNATIONAL LAW, 456 (Oxford University Press, 5th ed.).  
 119 DOLZER & STEVENS, supra note 109, at 61. 
 120 DOLZER & SCHREUER, supra note 27, at 149–53. 
 121 Id. 
 122 Alwyn Freeman, Responsibility of States for Unlawful Acts of Their Armed Forces, 
in COLLECTED COURSES OF THE HAGUE ACADEMY OF INTERNATIONAL LAW (1955). 
 123 AALP v. Sri Lanka, ICSID Case No. ARB/87/3, Final Award, ¶ 77 (June 27, 1990); 
see also IAN BROWNLIE, SYSTEM OF THE LAW OF NATIONS, STATE RESPONSIBILITY PART I 170 
(Oxford Univ. Press, 1986), quoted in DOAK BISHOP, JAMES CRAWFORD & MICHAEL W. REISMAN, 
FOREIGN INVESTMENT DISPUTES: CASES, MATERIALS AND COMMENTARY 1054 (2014).  
 124 United Nations Conference on Trade and Development, Investor-State Disputes 
Arising from Investment Treaties: A Review, 40–41 (2005). 
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In sum, States violate this standard when they are negligent.125  The 
standard does not impose strict liability for all acts with repercussions 
on the investment, and it should be compared to what any person would 
expect from other governments in the same circumstances.  
How does this translate to cases where indigenous communities or 
other vulnerable groups generate social unrest against an investor’s 
property?  More importantly, should the investment regime consider 
the role the companies play in provoking the unrest?  The investment 
tribunal in Bear Creek v. Peru faced this question and resolved that the 
causal link between the unrest and the company’s actions in the 
consultation process must be substantial enough to remove the mantel 
of protection provided by the investment regime.126  
2.  Poking the Bear: Foreign Direct Investment and Social 
Licenses 
As explained above, when governments sign BITs, they pledge to 
protect the companies doing business in their territories.  Tribunals 
might interpret the protection as an obligation to provide political and 
social stability.  The investment regime, however, is not clear on the 
responsibility that the companies have in fostering good relationships 
with the local population to maintain that stability.  Consequently, 
should the tribunals consider the corporate contributory responsibility 
to social unrest when assessing the government’s failure to provide a 
stable business environment?127  This question was discussed by the 
Bear Creek tribunal in its 2017 decision.128  
 
 125 BROWNLIE, supra note 118, at 456. 
 126 Bear Creek Mining Corp. v. Republic of Peru, ICSID Case No. ARB/14/21, Award, 
¶¶ 400–14 (Nov. 30, 2017). 
 127 For a review of the Bear Creek case, see Jean-Michel Marcoux and Andrew 
Newcombe, Bear Creek Mining Corporation v Republic of Peru: Two Sides of a ‘Social 
License’ to Operate, 33 ICSID REV. 3, 653 (2018); Joshua Paine, Bear Creek Mining 
Corporation v. Republic of Peru: Judging the Social License of Foreign Investment and 
Applying New Style Investment Treaties, 33 ICSID REV. 2, 340 (2018). 
 128 Bear Creek, ICSID Case No. ARB/14/21, Award, at ¶¶ 400–14.  For earlier cases in 
which international human rights treaties intersected with States’ obligations to foreign 
investors, see Urbaser S.A. and Consorcio de Aguas Bilbao Bizkaia, Bilbao Ur Partuergoa 
v. The Argentine Republic, ICSID Case No. ARB/07/26, Award (Dec. 8, 2016), 
¶¶ 1199–1202.  In Urbaser, the tribunal had to resolve the conflict between the 
investment treaty protections to foreign investors and human rights relating to dignity 
and adequate housing and living conditions.  In that particular context the tribunal 
stated that the State’s human rights duties “are complemented by an obligation on all 
parts, public and private parties, not to engage in activity aimed at destroying such 
rights.”  Id ¶ 1199.  Moreover, the BIT had to be “construed in harmony with other rules 
of international law of which if forms part, including those relating to human rights.”  Id. 
¶ 1200.  See also South American Silver Limited v. Bolivia, PCA Case No. 2013-15, Award 
(22 November 2018) (involving a mining concession in Bolivia that was canceled due to 
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The Bear Creek case arose out of a mining project in the southern 
Peruvian province of Puno.129  The project had the challenge of being 
located in the Santa Ana region, located fifty kilometers from the border 
with Bolivia, and surrounded several communities of the Aymara 
tribe.130  Along with fulfilling many permitting requirements, for the 
 
the unrest caused by indigenous communities, but which was later offered again to 
international investors).  Bolivia contended that the BIT must be interpreted in light of 
other international obligations of the Bolivian State, including the American Convention 
on Human Rights and the ILO Convention 169.  The tribunal, however, disregarded 
Bolivia’s claims based on the fact that it had not proven that these treaties were 
recognized customary international law or that the United Kingdom (the country of 
origin of the investor) was a party to the treaties.  The tribunal also found that the 
company could not claim a breach of its legitimate expectations when Bolivia canceled 
the concession due to the social unrest because the company knew in advance that it 
was operating in an area where indigenous communities resided and thus required 
special care regarding its interactions with them.  Id. ¶¶ 656–57.  The tribunal ultimately 
found that Bolivia breached the requirement to provide adequate compensation for the 
cancelation of the concession and decided not to reduce the amount, even after 
recognizing that the company contributed to the social conflict.  Id. ¶¶ 874–76.  See also 
Grand River Enterprises Six Nations, Ltd., et al. v. United States of America, UNCITRAL 
Case, Award (12 January 2011).  In Grand River, the members of a Canadian tribe 
presented an investment claim against the U.S. for tax actions taken against the sale of 
artisanal cigarettes produced in Canada but distributed in the U.S.  Id. ¶ 1.  The claimants 
in the case tried to argue that as part of customary international law and the minimum 
standard of treatment, the U.S. government should have consulted them before enacting 
the general tax regulations that affected their investments.  Id. ¶¶ 66–67.  The tribunal 
rejected the claim that the international commitments with indigenous communities in 
the UN Declaration of Indigenous Rights and the ILO Convention 169 were customary 
international law that could fall within the definition of the minimum standard of 
treatment of aliens.  Id. ¶¶ 209, 217–21.  See also Glamis Gold, Ltd. v. United States, 
UNCITRAL Case, Award (June 8, 2009).  The Glamis Gold case involved a Canadian Mining 
company investing in a California Desert Conservation Area that overlapped with the 
Quechan Indian tribe’s reservation lands.  Id. ¶ 10.  Under California law, companies 
operating in public lands were prohibited from using the land in such manner that 
would cause severe or irreparable damage to tribal cultural and religious sites.  
California also enacted new regulations requiring backfilling and grading for mining 
operations in the vicinity of tribal sacred sites.  Id. ¶ 11.  The Canadian company 
challenged the measures, arguing that these were arbitrary, discriminatory, and 
targeted to the Canadian company’s projects in order to make it economically unviable.  
Glamis contended that complying with the new regulations would constitute an 
expropriation under NAFTA Chapter XI.  Id. ¶ 11.  The tribunal allowed the indigenous 
communities to present an amicus brief arguing how the project would impact their 
historical sites, their ability to practice sacred traditions, and their communal life and 
development.  Id. ¶¶ 285–86.  Ultimately, the tribunal rejected the Canadian company’s 
claim of arbitrary and discriminatory treatment as not reaching the level required in the 
minimum standard of treatment of aliens.  To the tribunal, California’s actions would 
have to be “egregious and shocking,” making it impossible for the investors to access 
justice.  Id. ¶ 627.  In order words, the standard required a blatant unfairness and a 
complete lack of due process as evidence of the discrimination.  In the case of the 
regulatory actions taken by California, none of these elements were met.  Id. ¶ 824. 
 129 Bear Creek, ICSID Case No. ARB/14/21, Award, ¶¶ 140–49. 
 130 Id. 
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project to move forward, the companies had to jump through two 
critical legal hurdles: obtaining an environmental impact assessment 
that included an outreach program with the affected communities, and 
a “public necessity” decree granted by the Council of Ministers.131  Under 
the Peruvian Constitution, foreign investors could not acquire land near 
Peru’s borders unless the Council of Ministers issued a public necessity 
decree.132  The decree was a way for the government to ensure that 
foreign investment in the area would not jeopardize national security 
and the State’s territorial integrity.133 
 The public necessity decree authorizing Bear Creek to acquire 
mining rights for the Santa Ana Project was issued in November 2007.134  
Bear Creek then acquired seven titles to mining rights from its 
employee, a local Peruvian lawyer who obtained the titles in tandem 
with the company’s application for the decree.135  The environmental 
impact assessment, however, took longer and was followed by a number 
of workshops organized by the company and the government to inform 
the local population about the project.136  Even though the project 
received a positive environmental impact assessment, social protests 
arose.137  A majority of the communities opposed mining activities in the 
area and felt unheard by the company and the government.138  The 
unrest took several violent forms, including the burning of the 
company’s camp, assault on government and company officials, and a 
general strike in the region that lead to a blockade of the main bridge 
between Peru and Bolivia.139  After three years of significant unrest in 
Puno, the government revoked the public necessity decree.140  
Bear Creek argued in the arbitral proceedings that revoking the 
decree was tantamount to an expropriation of its investments because 
the revocation was politically motivated and discriminatory.141  
Moreover, according to the Canadian company, the government’s failure 
to control the social unrest breached the full protection and security 
 
 131 Id. 
 132 Id. ¶ 124. 
 133 Id. ¶ 469. 
 134 Id. ¶ 149. 
 135 Bear Creek, ICSID Case No. ARB/14/21, Award, ¶ 126–28. 
 136 Id. ¶ 556. 
 137 Id. ¶¶ 170, 172–91.  
 138 Id. ¶ 170; Bear Creek, ICSID Case No. ARB/14/21, Philippe Sands Partial 
Dissenting Opinion, ¶¶ 1, 18–19. 
 139 Bear Creek, ICSID Case No. ARB/14/21, Award, ¶¶ 170, 172–91.  
 140 Bear Creek, ICSID Case No. ARB/14/21, Philippe Sands Partial Dissenting Opinion, 
¶ 1. 
 141 Bear Creek, ICSID Case No. ARB/14/21, Award, ¶¶ 537–38. 
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standard of the Peru-Canada Free Trade Agreement.142  The company 
argued that the duty to consult and engage with communities was 
primarily a State responsibility.143  Bear Creek did its part by organizing 
workshops to inform the communities about the project and by offering 
job opportunities to members living close to the site.144  According to 
Bear Creek, it complied with Peruvian guidelines and regulations to the 
satisfaction of the Ministry of Mines, and thus Peru could not blame the 
company for the social opposition to the project.145  The government 
argued, however, that the company was partly responsible for the 
instability and had a duty to obtain a “social license” before investing in 
the region.146  The fact that it complied with formal requirements did 
not, according to the government, excuse the company from engaging 
positively with the local communities.147  International law thus 
mandated the company’s good faith, active participation in making sure 
that the consultation process addressed community concerns.148   
The investment tribunal sided with the company.149  The three 
arbitrators recognized first that the company could have gone further in 
its outreach activities, but they concluded that Bear Creek was not 
legally required to do so and that the State could not prove that its 
absence caused or contributed to the social unrest.150  In other words, 
there was no evidence that obtaining the “social license” was legally 
required or could have prevented the unrest.151  The fact that the 
company “complied with all legal requirements with regard to its 
 
 142 Id. ¶¶ 535–36.  The tribunal, however, decided not to analyze this claim since it 
had already found the revocation of the decree to be an indirect expropriation of the 
investment.  See id. ¶ 544. 
 143 Id. ¶  241. 
 144 Id.  ¶¶ 146, 261, 406–07. 
 145 Id. ¶¶  242–43. 
 146 Id. ¶¶  256–57. 
 147 Bear Creek, ICSID Case No. ARB/14/21, Award, ¶¶ 256–57. 
 148 Id.  
 149 Id. ¶¶ 558–59. 
 150 Id. ¶¶ 408, 410–12.  For this point, the tribunal relied on the Abengoa S.A. y Cofides 
S.A. v. United Mexican States Award where the tribunal held that, “[f]or the international 
responsibility of a State to be excluded or reduced based on the investor’s omission or 
fault, it is necessary not only to prove said omission or fault, but also to establish a causal 
link between [the omission or fault] and the harm suffered.  In other words, for the 
argument to succeed, there must be evidence that if a social communication program 
had been timely implemented since 2003, the 2009 and 2010 events that led to the loss 
of the claimant’s investment would not have occurred.”  Abengoa S.A. v. United Mexican 
States, ICSID Case No. ARB(AF)/09/2, Award, ¶¶ 670–71 (Apr. 18, 2013). 
 151 Bear Creek, ICSID Case No. ARB/14/21, Award, ¶¶ 408, 410–12. 
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outreach to the local communities” was enough to consider the 
company’s conduct sufficient.152  
The tribunal downplayed the arguments presented by the NGO 
representing members of the community.153  In an amicus brief and oral 
testimony, the advocates for the Aymara tribe argued that the company 
was not transparent in its dealings with the communities.154  The 
workshops were done in Spanish, as opposed to Aymara, and focused 
primarily on monetary and employment compensations.155  The 
community’s main concerns involved preserving spiritual sites in the 
mining area; the environmental impact that the activities would have on 
the rivers, forest, and species; and the health impact on the 
communities.156  Rather than being an opportunity to listen to the 
communities’ concerns, the workshops served as a formality for the 
company to offer economic benefits to some community members and 
document that it tried to inform the rest.157  As with many of the other 
cases presented in this Article, the Aymara people’s concerns could not 
fully translate into economic demands.158  Their spiritual connection 
with the land, their dependency on natural resources for their 
subsistence, and the community relations fostered by their connection 
with mother nature could not be substituted by some community 
members’ job opportunities.159  Both the company and the government 
ignored the Aymara tribe’s concerns during the consultation process, as 
did the majority of the tribunal in the arbitration proceeding. 
It is worth noting that Professor Phillips Sands was the only 
arbitrator to recognize the role played by the company’s actions in the 
emergence of the social unrest.160  Professor Sands agreed with the 
majority in that the decree’s revocation was tantamount to 
expropriation, and further agreed that “other and less draconian options 
were available,” such as a suspension of the decree, to address the 
growing social unrest.161  In his partially dissenting opinion, however, 
he recognized that the tribunal should have reduced the amount of 
 
 152 Id. ¶ 412. 
 153 Id. ¶¶ 406–09. 
 154 Id. ¶ 218. 
 155 Id. ¶ 225. 
 156 Id.  ¶¶ 224–26. 
 157 Bear Creek, ICSID Case No. ARB/14/21, Award, ¶¶ 224–26. 
 158 Id., ¶¶ 408, 410–12. 
 159 Id. ¶ 226. 
 160 Bear Creek, ICSID Case No. ARB/14/21, Philippe Sands Partial Dissenting Opinion, 
¶ 1 (Nov. 30, 2017). 
 161 Id.  ¶ 2. 
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awarded damages due to Bear Creek’s contribution to the social 
unrest.162  
Professor Sands disagreed with the majority’s assessment of the 
connection between the company’s conduct and the circumstances that 
gave rise to the social unrest and the revocation.163  In his words, “the 
Project collapsed because of the investor’s inability to obtain a ‘social 
license,’ the necessary understanding between the Project’s proponents 
and those living in the communities most likely to be affected by it, 
whether directly or indirectly.”164  To Sands, the company did not meet 
the conditions necessary to build trust over the long term with the local 
communities.165  Sands argued that the project required local support to 
be viable because of its massive infrastructure and clear impact on the 
region.166  A company engaging in such an activity could hardly expect 
that the project would run smoothly in the long run without local buy-
in. 
Professor Sands agreed with the tribunal’s majority that ILO 
Convention 169 imposes direct obligations on States.167  Still, this fact 
does not mean that the duty to consider the indigenous interests “is 
without significance or legal effects for [foreign investors].”168  Article 15 
of ILO Convention 169 mandates that companies and governments must 
consult with local communities and include them in the project’s 
benefits.169  Bear Creek, as a company engaging in a project that would 
affect the lives of indigenous communities, had, “at best, a semidetached 
 
 162 Id. ¶ 4. 
 163 Id. ¶ 5. 
 164 Id. ¶ 6. 
 165 Id.  
 166 Bear Creek, ICSID Case No. ARB/14/21, Philippe Sands Partial Dissenting Opinion, 
¶ 1. 
 167 Id. ¶ 9 (recognizing that both parties agreed that the Convention obligations 
applied to the Santa Ana Project and that “[i]t is the case, of course, that the obligation 
to implement the Convention is one that falls on States, by implementing the Convention 
through national laws”) 
 168 Id. ¶¶ 9–10.  
 169 Id. ¶ 13.  Article 15 of the ILO Convention 169 provides: “1.  The rights of the 
peoples concerned to the natural resources pertaining to their lands shall be especially 
safeguarded.  These rights include the right of these peoples to participate in the use, 
management and conservation of these resources.  2. In cases in which the State retains 
the ownership of mineral or sub-surface resources or rights to other resources 
pertaining to lands, governments shall establish or maintain procedures through which 
they shall consult these peoples, with a view of ascertaining whether and to what degree 
their interests would be prejudiced, before undertaking or permitting any programmes 
for the exploration or exploitation of such resources pertaining to their lands.  These 
peoples concerned shall wherever possible participate in the befits of such activities, 
and shall receive fair compensation for any damages which they may sustain as a result 
of such activities.”  ILO Convention 169, supra note 71, at art. 15. 
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relationship to the vital rights set forth in [Article 15] of the 
Convention.”170  The government must provide the legal framework to 
ensure that the consultation process complies with international law, 
but the company must also take the appropriate actions to obtain the 
“social license” necessary for the project to be successful in the long run.  
If the companies are aware, as in Bear Creek, that the local communities 
oppose the projects because their interests are ignored, they should 
pause and reassess their outreach program.  
Bear Creek’s strategy of moving forward with its failing outreach 
plan, including offering jobs to only some Aymara community members, 
fed into the unrest.171  Tribunals should not ignore such attitudes 
toward the communities when assessing damages.  To Professor Sands, 
the international investment regime “is not . . . an insurance policy 
against the failure of an inadequately prepared investor” to obtain a 
social license.172  In light of Bear Creek’s “significant and material” 
contributions to the unrest and that “its responsibilities are no less than 
those of the government,” the tribunal should have reduced the 
compensation owed to the company by half for the indirect 
expropriation of its assets.173   
D.  The Missed Opportunity of the USMCA (NAFTA 2.0) to Resolve 
the Clash 
Most international investment and trade agreements were signed 
in the decades preceding the end of the cold war.174  The main 
discussions in the international economic community revolved around 
the challenges faced by the decolonized developing nations and the 
former Soviet republics in attracting capital from the financial capitals 
located in Western democracies.175  Hence, it is no surprise that the 
system created around investment and trade agreements ignored the 
 
 170 Bear Creek, ICSID Case No. ARB/14/21, Philippe Sands Partial Dissenting Opinion, 
¶ 12. 
 171 Id. ¶ 33. 
 172 Id. ¶ 37 (“It may be the function of a State or its central government to deliver a 
domestic law framework that ensures that a consultation process and outcomes are 
consistent with Article 15 of ILO Convention 169, but it is not their function to hold an 
investor’s hand and deliver a ‘social license’ out of those processes.  It is for the investor 
to obtain the ‘social license,’ and in this case it was unable to do so largely because of its 
own failures.  The Canada-Peru FTA is not, any more than ICSID, an insurance policy 
against the failure of an inadequately prepared investor to obtain such a license.”). 
 173 Id. ¶ 39. 
 174 Garcia Sanchez, A Critical Approach, supra note 61 at 481–83 (describing the role 
played by the World Bank in designing a system to attract foreign direct investment to 
less developed nations).  
 175 Id. 
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impact that investment could have on minorities in the host State.  What 
is surprising is the fact that the most recently negotiated international 
trade and investment agreement in North America failed to conclusively 
address this issue.  The following Section will explain how the USMCA, 
enacted in 2020, had the opportunity to remedy the clash of rights head-
on.  Even though the agreement changed foreign investment protection 
in the region, it ultimately illustrated the classical and utilitarian view of 
property rights applied to the extraction of natural resources.  
On January 16, 2020, the U.S. Senate, with an eighty-nine to ten 
vote, adopted implementing legislation for the revised USMCA.176  This 
was a surprisingly bipartisan vote considering that House of 
Representatives managers presented the first articles of impeachment 
against President Donald J. Trump the same day.177  Mexico ratified the 
agreement in June 2019, but House Democrats were able to convince 
White House negotiators to strengthen the enforcement mechanisms on 
the labor chapter with inspections, sending the ratification process into 
chaos.178  Notwithstanding the blow to its sovereignty, Mexico accepted 
the implementation legislation, and the two nations ratified the 
agreement.179  Canada’s ratification followed on March 13, 2020.180 
The historic negotiation of the USMCA in the middle of an 
impeachment trial, with a change of administration in Mexico a year 
earlier and a reluctant Canada, also started a fundamental conversation 
about the clash of indigenous rights and foreign investment.181  The 
initial round of negotiations included a Canadian proposal for a chapter 
on indigenous rights that would have recognized their “roles in the 
 
 176 Emily Cochrane, Senate Votes to Pass Revised NAFTA, Sending Pact to Trump’s Desk, 
N.Y. TIMES (Jan. 16, 2020), https://www.nytimes.com/2020/01/16/us/politics/usmca-
vote.html. 
 177 Id. 
 178 Mary Beth Sheridan, Mexico Becomes First Country to Ratify New North American 
Trade Deal, WASH. POST (June 19, 2019, 8:42 PM), https://www.washingtonpost.com/
world/the_americas/mexico-becomes-first-country-to-ratify-usmca-north-american-
trade-deal/2019/06/19/500dd8c0-92b3-11e9-956a-88c291ab5c38_story.html; Katie 
Lobosco, Natalie Gallón, Allie Malloy & Maegan Vazquez, US and Mexico Say Trade Deal 
Is On Track After Hurried Last-Minute Objections, CNN (Dec. 16, 2019, 9:41 PM), 
https://www.cnn.com/2019/12/16/politics/usmca-mexico-labor-concerns/
index.html. 
 179 Id. 
 180 David Ljunggren, Canadian Parliament Rushes Through Ratification of USMCA 
Trade Pact, REUTERS (March 13, 2020), https://www.reuters.com/article/us-usa-trade-
usmca-canada/canadian-parliament-rushes-through-ratification-of-usmca-trade-pact-
idUSKBN2102I5. 
 181 Jorge Barrera, New Trade Agreement a “Step Up” from NAFTA on Indigenous Rights, 
CBC NEWS (Oct. 1, 2018, 6:00 PM), https://www.cbc.ca/news/indigenous/usmca-trade-
deal-indigenous-rights-1.4846073. 
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conservation of the environment, sustainable fisheries, forestry and 
biodiversity conversation.”182  In the final text, Canada’s proposal was 
reduced and transferred to Chapter 32, Exceptions and General 
Provisions.183  Article 32.5 provides that “this agreement does not 
preclude a Party from adopting or maintaining a measure it deems 
necessary to fulfill its legal obligations to indigenous peoples.”184  The 
exception covers the entire USMCA.  The only caveat is that such 
measures are not “used as a means of arbitrary or unjustified 
discrimination against persons of the other Parties or a disguised 
restriction on trade in goods, services, and investment.”185  
For the first time in the region, a treaty recognized the importance 
of other international obligations vis-a-vis trade and investment rights.  
The treaty does not, however, recognize community-oriented property 
rights as the original Canadian draft did and does not uphold the 
responsibility of the State to protect those rights above the rights of 
foreign investors and trade agreements.  In the context of energy 
infrastructure, it is unclear how Article 32.5 would apply.  For example, 
if the State conducts a previous and informed consultation but the 
communities still reject the investment project in their lands, the State 
could argue that it had fulfilled its legal obligations to indigenous people 
and move forward with the project.  Moreover, as the Bear Creek case 
described above shows, for investment tribunals, the State still has a 
duty to consult the communities.  Suppose the government conducts a 
consultation process that does not achieve full consent from the 
communities and eventually faces international outcry in human rights 
tribunals.  If the State decides to cancel the project, would the investors 
still be able to bring investment claims?  Does Article 32.5 release the 
State from any liability for the government’s failure to protect investors 
from a lack of official adequate consultation processes?  The USMCA is 
silent on this issue.  What is clear is the fact that if a concrete case arises, 
and the State raises a defense under Article 32.5, an international 
investment tribunal will have to analyze whether the State’s action was 
done to fulfill its obligations with indigenous people, subjecting the 
government’s measures to international scrutiny.  But this review is an 
ex post analysis after the conflict emerges, not an a priori recognition of 
the value of indigenous culture over other public benefits defined by the 
 
 182 Id. 
 183 Id. 
 184 United States-Mexico-Canada Agreement, Can.-Mex.-U.S., Nov. 30, 2018, 134 Stat. 
11, art. 32.5 (2020), https://ustr.gov/trade-agreements/free-trade-agreements/
united-states-mexico-canada-agreement/agreement-between [hereinafter USMCA]. 
 185 Id. 
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State.  Even if the USMCA is a good step forward to resolving the clash of 
rights, we still do not have an international treaty that prioritizes the 
protection of communities over the State and investors’ rights.  
Another example of how the USMCA was a missed opportunity to 
avoid the clash of rights is its loose reference to corporate social 
responsibility.186  Specifically, Article 14.17 is an invitation to promote 
corporate social responsibility—a far more benign approach than an 
imposition of a duty on signatories:   
[The three states] reaffirm the importance of each party 
encouraging enterprises operating within its territory or 
subject to its jurisdiction to voluntarily incorporate into their 
internal policies those internationally recognized standards, 
guidelines, and principles of corporate social responsibility 
that have been endorsed or are supported by that Party, which 
may include the OECD Guidelines for Multinational 
Enterprises.187 
As examples of the issues that the standards, guidelines, and 
principles may address, the three States included “labor, environment, 
gender equality, human rights, indigenous and aboriginal people’s rights, 
and corruption.”188  This provision only recognized the importance to 
promote these principles, rather than a duty of the signing parties or a 
requirement for investments made in each State. 
Notwithstanding the missed opportunity to address directly the 
clash of rights, the investment chapter did advance four elements that 
will change the way foreign direct investment is protected in the 
region.189  First, it defined more broadly the term investment and 
enumerated a nonexclusive list of examples that include licenses and 
concessions.190  Second, Canada and the U.S. would not be subject to the 
investor-State dispute settlement (ISDS) mechanism.  Moreover, Mexico 
and the U.S. will be subject to the mechanism only for breaches of 
national treatment, most-favored-nation treatment, or direct 
expropriation.191  Notably, however, the USMCA excludes from these 
limitations Mexican government contracts with oil and gas companies, 
as well as contracts for power generation, telecommunications, 
 
 186 Id. at art. 14.17. 
 187 Id. (emphasis added). 
 188 Id. (emphasis added). 
 189 Id.  
 190 USMCA, supra note 184, at art. 14.1. 
 191 Id. at art. 14.4, 14.5. 
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transportation, and infrastructure companies.192  These types of 
investments receive the full protection of the investment chapter and 
have their own dispute resolution provisions.193  Third, the USMCA 
further clarified the minimum standard of treatment of aliens, including 
full protection of security, to limit responsibilities to only what is 
required under customary international law.194  Finally, the agreement 
created exceptions to claims against the adoption of environmental, 
health, and “public welfare” policies.195  In this way, any policies under 
the social/environmental umbrella would not be considered a violation 
of the foreign investors’ legitimate expectations. 
The USMCA, however, also serves as a reaffirmation of the way 
liberal and utilitarian views of property rights inform the role of 
sovereigns in the extraction of natural resources.196  Chapter 8 
specifically regulates the ownership of hydrocarbons.  It serves as a 
confirmation that Mexico, Canada, and the U.S. fully respect each other’s 
sovereign rights to regulate the extraction of hydrocarbons “in 
accordance with their respective Constitutions and domestic laws, in 
the full exercise of their democratic processes.”197  It specifies that in the 
case of Mexico, the United States and Canada recognize that it “reserves 
its sovereign right to reform its Constitution and its domestic 
legislation,” and that it “has the direct inalienable, and imprescriptible 
ownership of all hydrocarbons in the subsoil of the national territory, 
including the continental shelf and the exclusive economic zone located 
outside the territorial sea and adjacent thereto.”198  And consistent with 
 
 192 Id. at Annex 14-E (Annex 14-E specifies that it only applies to government 
contracts signed in Mexico in the covered sectors.  The USMCA does not contain a similar 
provisions for government contracts signed with Canada and the U.S.). 
 193 Id.  
 194 Id. at art 14.6.2 (“For greater certainty, paragraph 1 prescribes the customary 
international law minimum standard of treatment of aliens as the standard of treatment 
to be afforded to covered investments.  The concepts of ‘fair and equitable treatment’ 
and ‘full protection and security’ do not require treatment in addition to or beyond that 
which is required by that standard, and do not create additional substantive rights.  The 
obligations in paragraph 1 to provide: (a) ‘fair and equitable treatment’ includes the 
obligation not to deny justice in criminal, civil, or administrative adjudicatory 
proceedings in accordance with the principle of due process embodied in the principal 
legal systems of the world; and (b) ‘full protection and security’ requires each Party to 
provide the level of police protection required under customary international law.”) 
 195 Id. at art. 14.16 (“Nothing in this Chapter shall be construed to prevent a Party 
from adopting, maintaining or enforcing any measure otherwise consistent with this 
Chapter that it considers appropriate to ensure that investment activity in its territory 
is undertaken in a manner sensitive to environmental, health, safety, or other regulatory 
objectives.”). 
 196 USMCA, supra note 184, at chap. 8. 
 197 Id.  
 198 Id. 
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the views that the agreement is primarily designed to protect foreign 
investors, Chapter 8 specifies that the recognition of the State’s property 
over the hydrocarbons is “without prejudice of their rights and 
remedies available under this Agreement.”199  In other words, States 
have the sovereign right to regulate the extraction of the resources 
contained in their territory and can modify their legislation according to 
their own democratic processes, but the rights of companies that have 
signed contracts with the State shall be respected in accordance with the 
USMCA.  This is a clear example of how companies become an extension 
of the State for the purposes of oil and gas extraction, and of how 
international law extends a mantel of protection against discriminatory 
policies taken against them.  The USMCA does not, however, extend the 
same level of protection to communities.  
III.  EXAMPLES OF RIGHTS CLASHING FROM OIL FIELDS IN ECUADOR TO TAR 
SANDS IN CANADA 
The following Part provides concrete examples that exemplify the 
clash of interests that arise when the State authorizes foreign investors 
to build energy infrastructure over indigenous land.  This Part 
emphasizes the arguments presented by the three parties involved—
the State, the companies, and the indigenous communities—and sheds 
light on the fact that the analysis for finding a breach of international 
obligations turns into a monetization of the value of the affected 
property, be that indigenous land or foreign investor assets.  As Section 
III.A will show, the primary remedy offered by international law, with 
its heavy emphasis on the economic value of property, benefits the 
foreign investors to the detriment of the communities.  A note of caution 
is warranted.  This Part does not substantially discuss domestic 
proceedings initiated by the parties involved or how domestic 
legislation regulates the rights of indigenous people or foreign 
investors.  It only refers to local proceedings and regulations to the 
extent that they connect with the arguments brought by the affected 
parties to international proceedings. 
  
 
 199 Id. 
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A.  A Tale of Two International Tribunals: The Burlington Resources 
ICSID Case and the Sarayaku People in the IACtHR Case 
In the past two decades, Ecuador has been accused five times of 
violating the right of foreign companies investing in the hydrocarbons 
sector.200  All of these cases involved investments from foreign nationals 
in the Ecuadorian Amazonian region, which contains hydrocarbon 
fields.201  Out of these five cases, the full protection and security 
principle was mentioned three times as one of the violated rights.202  The 
violations were alleged to have originated from legislation that affected 
the original contractual obligations between Ecuador, its state-owned 
company, Petroecuador, and foreign investors.  
In one of those cases, Occidental Petroleum claimed $1.77 billion in 
damages.203  Ecuador was found in breach of international law in only 
some of the three cases.  But the fact is that Ecuador has a reputation for 
not protecting foreign energy-related investments.  This reputation has 
even led the State to denunciate its consent to the International Center 
for Settlement of Investment Disputes (ICSID) Convention in 2009.204  
 
 200 Chevron Corp. v. Republic of Ecuador, UNCITRAL, PCA Case No. 34877, Final 
Award, ¶ 30, 208 (Aug. 31, 2011); Perenco Ecuador Ltd. v. Republic of Ecuador, ICSID 
Case No. ARB/08/6, Decision on Jurisdiction, ¶ 1 (June 30, 2011); Burlington Res. Inc. v. 
Ecuador, ICSID Case No. ARB/08/5, Decision on Jurisdiction, ¶ 26 (June 2, 2010); 
Occidental Petroleum Corp. v. Republic of Ecuador, ICSID Case No. ARB/06/11, Decision 
on Jurisdiction, ¶ 10 (Sept. 9, 2008); EnCana Corp. v. Republic of Ecuador, LCIA Case No. 
UN3481, Award, ¶ 26, 27, 107 (Feb. 3, 2006); Occidental Expl. & Prod. Co. v. Republic of 
Ecuador, LCIA Case No. UN3467, Final Award, ¶ 6, 25, 27 (July 1, 2004).  
 201 Chevron Corp., UNCITRAL, PCA Case No. 34877, Final Award, ¶ 208, 211; Perenco 
Ecuador Ltd., ICSID Case No. ARB/08/6, Decision on Jurisdiction, ¶ 1; Burlington Res., 
Inc., ICSID Case No. ARB/08/5, Decision on Jurisdiction, ¶ 15; Occidental Petroleum 
Corp., ICSID Case No. ARB/06/11, Decision on Jurisdiction, ¶ 2; EnCana Corp., LCIA Case 
No. UN3481, Award, ¶ 35; Occidental Expl. & Prod. Co., LCIA Case No. UN3467, Final 
Award, ¶ 27. 
 202 Chevron Corp., UNCITRAL, PCA Case No. 34877, Final Award, ¶ 39; Burlington Res. 
Inc., ICSID Case No. ARB/08/5, Decision on Jurisdiction, ¶ 212; Occidental Expl. & Prod. 
Co., LCIA Case No. UN3467, Final Award, at ¶ 179. 
 203 Occidental Petroleum Corp., ICSID Case No. ARB/06/11, Award, ¶ 876; Tai-Heng 
and Lucas Bento, ICSID’s Largest Award in History: An Overview of Occidental Petroleum 
Corporation v. The Republic of Ecuador, KLUWER ARBITRATION BLOG (Dec. 19, 2012), 
http://arbitrationblog.kluwerarbitration.com/2012/12/19/icsids-largest-award-in-
history-an-overview-of-occidental-petroleum-corporation-v-the-republic-of-ecuador. 
 204 In October 2007, the World Bank’s International Centre for Settlement of 
Investment Disputes (ICSID) received a notice from the Republic of Ecuador that it will 
no longer consent to ICSID jurisdiction as a forum for resolving mining and energy 
disputes with foreign investors.  The denunciation was extended to all disputes on July 
6, 2009.  Kate Cervantes-Knox & Elinor Thomas, Ecuador Terminates 12 BITs—A 
Growing Trend of Reconsideration of Traditional Investment Treaties?, DLP PIPER, (May 
15, 2017), https://www.dlapiper.com/en/mexico/insights/publications/2017/05/
ecuador-terminates-12-bits-a-growing-trend; see also ICSID News Release, 
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One of the best-known cases in the United States involved Chevron 
Corporation/Texaco because tribe groups affected by its operations in 
Ecuador filed class actions against its parent company in the United 
States.205  In those proceedings, U.S. courts rejected the complaint 
according to the principle of forum non conveniens, and the local 
plaintiffs had to go back to Ecuador and initiate proceedings there.206  
The case became an international sensation when the Ecuadorian courts 
issued a $9.5 billion judgment against Chevron for the contamination of 
the Lago Agrio region.207  In response, Chevron/Texaco brought a claim 
against Ecuador for denial of justice in an investment tribunal through 
the Ecuador-U.S. Bilateral Investment Treaty and parallel RICO claims 
against the lawyer representing the indigenous communities, Steven 
Donzinger, for false statements and fraudulent proceedings in 
Ecuador.208 
But there are other examples of the interplay between foreign 
investors and indigenous rights that are less studied.  One example is 
the case of Burlington Resources against Ecuador and the parallel 
proceeding brought by the Sarayaku tribe against the State in the 
IACtHR.209  The Burlington Resources/Sarayaku people case is a 
paradigmatic example of the interplay between human rights and 
 
Denunciation of the ICSID Convention by Ecuador (July 09, 2009), https://icsid.world
bank.org/news-and-events/news-releases/denunciation-icsid-convention-ecuador. 
 205 Lago Agrio Plaintiffs v. Chevron Corp., 409 F. App’x 393, 394 (2d Cir. 2010); 
Aguinda v. Texaco, Inc., 303 F.3d 470, 473 (2d Cir. 2002). 
 206 When the Ecuadorian courts found for the plaintiffs, Chevron/Texaco brought a 
claim against Ecuador for denial of justice in an investment tribunal through the 
Ecuador-U.S. Bilateral Investment Treaty.  See Chevron Corp. v. Ecuador (II), PCA Case 
No. 2009-23, Memorial on Jurisdictional Objections of the Republic of Ecuador, ¶ 161 
n.238 (Aug 31, 2011), https://www.italaw.com/cases/257. 
 207 Jonathan Stempel, Lawyer Who Took on Chevron in Ecuador is Disbarred in New 
York, REUTERS (Aug. 14, 2020), https://www.reuters.com/article/us-usa-donziger-
idUSKCN25A2P4. 
 208 Chevron Corporation and Texaco Petroleum Company v. Republic of Ecuador, PCA 
Case No. 2009-23, Second Partial Award on Track II (20 August, 2018), available at the 
press release by Chevron summarizing the claims against Ecuador for denial of justice 
in Ecuadorian courts (Sept. 2018), http://chevron.com/stories/international-tribunal-
rules-for-chevron-in-ecuador-case.  For the U.S. claims, see Chevron Corp. v. Donziger, 
No. 11 Civ. 0691 (LAK), 2013 WL 1087236, at *6 (S.D.N.Y. Mar. 15, 2013); Chevron Corp. 
v. Donziger, No. 11 Civ. 0691, 2013 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 24086 (S.D.N.Y. Feb. 21, 2013); 
Chevron Corp. v. Donziger, 886 F.Supp.2d 235 (S.D.N.Y. 2012); Chevron Corp. v. 
Donziger, 768 F. Supp. 2d 581 (S.D.N.Y. 2011), injunction vacated on other grounds, 
Chevron Corp. v. Camacho Naranjo, 667 F.3d 232 (2d Cir. 2012).  See generally Chevron’s 
website, AMAZON POST, http://www.theamazonpost.com, about the litigation which 
contains court documents, video clips, media reports and other background on the case.  
 209 Christina Binder & Jane A. Hofbuer, Case Study: Burlington Resources Inc. v. 
Ecuador/Kichwa Indigenous People of Sarayaku v. Ecuador, INT’L L. ASS’N, 
https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2810062. 
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investment claims at the international level.  It further exemplifies how 
the rights of indigenous people, through the lens of liberal and 
utilitarian property law interpretations, overlap with the property 
rights of foreign companies.210  
The facts of the case begin in 1996 when Petroecuador signed a 
production sharing contract (“PSC”) with an Argentinean-based 
company, CGC, for the development of two oil reserves in the Amazonian 
region.211  Blocks 23 and 24 were located in a territory traditionally 
inhabited by indigenous communities, the largest of which belonged to 
the Sarayaku tribe.212  According to the terms of the PSC, the government 
was responsible for relations with the indigenous communities, and for 
obtaining third-party permits, rights-of-way, or easement that might be 
necessary for the development of the area.213  But the contractor was 
required to submit an environmental impact assessment for the 
exploration phase, which included a description of the social, economic, 
and cultural aspects of the population in the area.214  The assessment by 
the company was completed and approved by the government in 
1997.215  
The Sarayaku tribe, composed of around 1,200 people, received 
official recognition and title to their land from the government in 
1992.216  The title was designed “to protect the ecosystems of the 
Ecuadorian Amazon basin, to improve the living standards of the 
indigenous communities, and to preserve the integrity of their 
culture[.]”217  But the title also recognized the fact that it should “not 
limit the State’s authority to build roads, ports, airports and other 
infrastructure needed for the country’s economic development and 
security,” and that the “[s]ubsoil natural resources are the property of 
the State, which may exploit them without interference provided that 
environmental protection standards are observed.”218  
 
 
 210 The case involved indigenous communities bringing claims to the IACtHR and a 
company bringing claims against the State for lack of full protection and security.  
Sarayaku Merits and Reparations, supra note 87, ¶ 2 (June 27, 2012); Burlington Res. 
Inc. v. Ecuador, ICSID Case No. ARB/08/5, Decision on Jurisdiction, ¶ 53 (June 2, 2010).  
 211 Sarayaku Merits and Reparations, supra note 87, ¶ 64. 
 212 Id. ¶ 65. 
 213 Id.   
 214 Id. ¶ 68. 
 215 Id. ¶ 69. 
 216 Id. ¶¶ 52, 61.   
 217 Sarayaku Merits and Reparations, supra note 87, ¶ 62. 
 218 Id. 
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To preserve the social, cultural, economic, and environmental 
integrity of the communities, the government declared in the title that it 
would “take into account the plans and programs that, to this end, are 
prepared by the respective indigenous communities and submitted to 
the Government’s consideration.”219  The “taking into consideration” 
provision did not establish an upfront right to be consulted regarding 
projects related to the extraction of mineral resources or the 
infrastructure around such operations.  
In 1998, two years after CGC signed the PSC, Ecuador ratified ILO 
Convention No. 169.220  In 2001, the government modified the 
environmental regulations for hydrocarbon operations to include the 
right of previous and informed consultation of indigenous communities.  
The law describes a consultation process requiring the government to 
“hear their suggestions and opinions.”221  If the government reached an 
agreement with the communities, the contract had to be “drafted 
according to the principles of compensation and reparation for possible 
environmental impacts and damage to property that the execution of 
the fuel production projects might cause.”222  Additionally, 
compensation for the loss or damage of property “shall be calculated on 
the basis of the official tables in force.”223  Hence, the right of 
consultation is not a veto but rather a process where communities might 
raise their concerns and receive upfront compensation for the damage 
to or loss of property.   
The conflict between the company and the communities started 
right after the environmental impact assessment was completed in 
1997 and continued throughout the first years of the exploration 
stage.224  In 1999, the government approved the suspension of activities 
in Block 23 because the companies’ “activities [were] being affected by 
actions against the workers by indigenous organizations and 
destruction of the camp.”225  As a consequence, “the Ecuadorian Ministry 
of Defense signed a Cooperation Agreement on Military Security with 
the oil companies . . . in which the State undertook ‘to ensure the safety 
of oil facilities, and of the persons who work in them.’”226 
 
 219 Id. 
 220 Id. ¶ 70.   
 221 Id. ¶ 77. 
 222 Id.  
 223 Sarayaku Merits and Reparations, supra note 87, ¶ 77. 
 224 Id. ¶¶ 69, 72, 81.   
 225 Id. ¶ 72  
 226 Id. ¶ 78.  
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The communities’ opposition was considered force majeure, and as 
such, the suspension was extended several times until September 
2002.227  At that point, CGC had transferred 100 percent of its interests 
in Block 24 and 50 percent of its interests in Block 23 to Burlington 
Resources, an American-based company.228  In that year, CGC issued an 
updated environmental impact study and the government allowed it to 
proceed with its operations.  As the drills and explosives began to arrive, 
the communities organized camps around the field access points and 
protested the company’s incursion onto their land.  According to 
Burlington, the “opposition from the indigenous communities, in the 
form of violent attacks and death threats, intensified following 
Burlington Ecuador’s acquisition.”229  Examples of these attacks 
included “the destruction of the contractors’ seismic study base, the 
setting on fire of their camp, and the kidnapping of several 
employees.”230  The attacks continued until Burlington sought to trigger 
the force majeure clause in the contract due to its inability to securely 
access the fields.  In response, the Sarayaku claimed that the 
government had not consulted them before authorizing the projects. 
The companies tried to negotiate with the Sarayaku people, 
offering monetary compensations, medical care, jobs, and other 
benefits.231  Part of the company’s strategy involved hiring a “team of 
sociologists and anthropologists dedicated to planning community 
relations.”232  The operator also faced challenges in identifying adequate 
representatives of the communities, and hence engaged in negotiations 
with the communities both individually and with the communities’ 
elected leaders under the Organizacion de Pueblos Indigenas de 
Pastanzas (OPIP).  OPIP viewed the company’s negotiation team as 
intruders who were trying to divide the communities, manipulate the 
leaders, and carry out defamation campaigns.233  Notwithstanding the 
negative view of the negotiation team, five communities accepted the 
benefits, including payments that ranged between $50,600 and 
$222,600 per community, and formed a group in support of the 
company’s operations.234  Nevertheless, OPIP leadership rejected all of 
 
 227 Id. ¶ 72, 81, 83. 
 228 Burlington Res. Inc. v. Ecuador, ICSID Case No. ARB/08/5, Decision on 
Jurisdiction, ¶¶ 14–17 (June 2, 2010). 
 229 Id. ¶ 30. 
 230 Id. ¶ 35 
 231 Id. ¶ 32; Binder & Hofbuer, supra note 209, at 5. 
 232 Sarayaku, Merits and Reparations, supra note 87, ¶ 75 (June 27, 2012). 
 233 Id. ¶ 75. 
 234 Id. ¶¶ 73–74.  According to the record in the IACtHR’s decision, “On August 26, 
2002, the CGC submitted to the Ministry of Energy and Mines the following five 
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the proposals, arguing that the companies had no right to enter their 
lands and that the company was fostering division among them by 
reaching individual deals.  The division among the communities was so 
stark that violent attacks, threats, and harassment among different 
members of the Sarayaku people occurred between 2003 and 2004, 
forcing the Ecuadorian police to intervene to keep peace in the region.235  
By mid-2003, the oil company had placed several explosives that 
destroyed caves, water resources, and underground rivers, and also cut 
down trees and plants that held sacred and cultural value to the 
communities.236  Moreover, seismic lines passed near sacred sites used 
for religious ceremonies of the Sarayaku people.237  It was at this point 
that things began escalating to the international fora. 
1.  The Paralleled Proceedings: Tribes to the IACtHR and 
Investors to an ICSID Arbitral Tribunal 
Both the communities and investors brought claims against 
Ecuador in international tribunals for the same policies and events that 
led to the conflicts in the Amazon.  As the history of the proceedings 
below shows, the same actions can be categorized by one tribunal as 
violations of the title awarded to the communities and of their right to 
be consulted, but in another tribunal, as violations of the full protection 
and security of the foreign investors’ property rights.  
i.  The IACtHR Process 
In 2003, a couple of years into the conflict, the Kichwa People of 
Sarayaku filed a petition before the Inter-American Commission of 
Human Rights.238  The Commission investigated the human rights 
violation claims therein, issued a report in 2009, and brought the case 
to the IACtHR a year later.  In its initial report, the Commission argued 
that Ecuador breached international human rights through the 
“granting by the State of a permit to a private oil company to carry out 
 
investment agreements signed with indigenous communities or associations on August 
6, 2002, before the Second Notary of the canton of Pastaza: FENAQUIPA Organization, 
US$194,000.00; AIEPRA Organization, Jatun Molino community and Independent 
Communities of Sarayaku, US$194,900.00; FENASH-P Federation, US$150,000.00; 
Association of Indigenous Centers of Pacayaku, US$222,600.00, and Achuar Community 
of Shaimi, US$50,600.00.  These agreements, with the respective plan of action, were 
based on contributions to production projects, infrastructure, job training, health and 
education to be made as the seismic survey activities were carried out in their 
territories.”  Id. ¶ 82. 
 235 Id. ¶¶ 106, 107–11.   
 236 Id. ¶¶ 104–05.   
 237 Id. ¶ 105. 
 238 Sarayaku Merits and Reparations, supra note 87,  ¶ 1.   
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exploration and exploitation activities in the territory of the Kichwa 
Indigenous People of Sarayaku . . . without previously consulting them 
and without obtaining their consent.”239  The Commission went further.  
It stated that “the company began the exploration phase, and even 
introduced high-powered explosives in several places on indigenous 
territory, thereby creating an alleged situation of risk for the population 
because, for a time, this prevented them from seeking means of 
subsistence and limited their rights to freedom of movement and to 
cultural expression.”240  Based on these facts, the Commission asked the 
IACtHR to “declare the international responsibility of the State for the 
violation of . . [t]he right to private property, recognized in Article 21, in 
relation to Articles 13, 23, and 1(1) of the American Convention, to the 
detriment of the Kichwa People of Sarayaku and its members.”241  The 
Commission also asked the court to declare the State in violation of the 
rights to life, judicial guarantees, judicial protection, freedom of 
movement and residence, personal integrity, and the obligation to adopt 
domestic legal measures to implement the American Convention.242  The 
Commission’s request is a clear example of how the structure of the 
claim in international tribunals begins with a liberal and utilitarian 
private property approach to conflicts that emerge between 
communities and extractive industries.  Tribes might not perceive the 
question as one of private property but as one involving social, cultural, 
and religious relationships with the land they inhabit.  Still, the 
international legal system forces them to frame the questions around 
property rights. 
Some elements in the IACtHR’s decision allow us to perceive the 
different views that the communities have around the land.  For 
example, after the Commission filed its claim before the IACtHR, the 
communities were invited to submit their observations to the original 
complaint filed by the Commission, and they added the right to culture 
as one that should be included in the case file.243  The tribe believed that 
 
 239 Id. ¶ 2.  
 240 Id.  
 241 Id. ¶ 3 (emphasis added).  Article 13 recognizes freedom of expression and 
thought, Article 23 recognizes the right to participate in government, and Article 1 
recognizes the obligation to respect rights without any discrimination.  American 
Convention, supra note 95. 
 242 Id. 
 243 Id. ¶ 6 (Under Articles 35, 36 and 37 of the Rules of Procedure of the IACtHR the 
victims are not allowed to bring claims directly to the IACtHR.  The Inter-American 
Commission files the claims on behalf of the victims (Article 36).  Under Articles 25, 42 
and 43 of the Rules of Procedure, the IACtHR allows victims to file a brief in order to give 
them an opportunity to voice their concerns or to add grievances not presented by the 
Commission.  Rules of Procedure of the Inter-American Court of Human Rights, 
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the activities had deprived them of a life according to their culture and 
traditions.  This was confirmed during the in situ visit to the fields, 
where the communities expressed the grievances as a loss of “ancestral 
knowledge” connected to forest in their land.244  Culture and ancestral 
knowledge are two elements that are hardly captured by the liberal and 
utilitarian approach to property rights.  That approach, as explained in 
the previous Sections, is primarily focused on the economic value of land 
and its potential for wealth. 
For the Sarayaku tribe, land ownership does not fit the traditional 
utilitarian approach that the liberal and utilitarian conception inserts 
into property rights.  The Sarayaku communities are composed of 
various ayllus (extended families) that are formed through marriages 
that result in alliances.245  Farming is done in a communitarian way 
through chakra (village farms), where families plant yucca, yam, 
plantain, maize, potatoes, cane, fruit, palm trees, beans, chili peppers, 
tomatoes, and squash.246  The chakras are also used for other purposes, 
such as to cultivate medicinal plants and timber trees and to create 
educational spaces for children to learn how to recognize and grow 
plants for the community.247  The communities also build purinas-tambu 
(seasonal communal facilities by the river), which are used for hunting 
and fishing.  Yachaks (shamans), who according to the tribe can 
communicate with the natural world, assist with the selection of the 
communal facilities.248  To the Saryaku, the forest is alive—kawsaka 
sacha—and “every natural space is a llakta (village) with spiritual 
populations.”249  In this way, the purinas-tambus are built with respect 
for sacred locations, identifying suitable areas that will not lead to 
overhunting or overfishing so that the activities allow for repopulation 
of fauna.250  The Sarayaku communitarian method for farming, hunting, 
and fishing covers 90 percent of the community’s dietary needs. 
Given these communities’ perspective toward and connection with 
the land, it is hard to picture how the liberal and utilitarian view of 
property rights could fit.  An attempt to do so would immediately 
attempt to monetize the value of the property or to compensate with 
 
approved by the Court in November 16–28, 2009, available at 
http://www.corteidh.or.cr/reglamento.cfm?lang=en). 
 244 Sarayaku Merits and Reparations, supra note 87, ¶ 23. 
 245 The Amazon Conservation Team, Sarayaku: In Defense of Territory, 
https://www.amazonteam.org/maps/sarayaku-en (last visited Nov. 1, 2019). 
 246 Id. 
 247 Id. 
 248 Id. 
 249 Id. 
 250 Id. 
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other types of reparations involving a view that includes a cost-benefit 
analysis.  It would downplay the role of the social and spiritual relations 
that emerge with their land as the guiding factor for resolving the 
conflict.  A clear example of how the cost-benefit analysis loses sight of 
these dimensions can be found in the declarations of the Ecuadorian 
government before the IACtHR, after recognizing the international 
responsibility of the State.  In the words of the Secretary of Legal Affairs 
of the Presidency of Ecuador:  
A new round [for the auction of the fields] will not begin 
without informed consultation.  And what is this consultation?  
In particular, it deals with what was said about pollution; what 
should not be polluted, because rivers and communities 
cannot be polluted by oil activities . . . and we must discuss the 
situation of the communities themselves.  What is the health 
situation?  What about education?  When we begin to discuss 
the oil issue, we could have the best doctors treating the 
mothers in the communities, we could have the best health 
teams and best teachers coming from Quito to the area, if there 
is going to be money generated by the oil exploration.251 
 The government’s view fails to capture the spiritual value of the 
land and its connections to indigenous communities.  Rather than 
protecting the way the communities socially and culturally relate to the 
forest, the government monetizes the problem and finds solutions that 
translate into “bringing” outside elements into the community to 
compensate for the damages caused by the extractive activities.  The 
best doctors and professors from the capital are to be brought into the 
communities as if these actions were to be considered equal to, or even 
better than, the loss of the “ancestral knowledge” that is affected by the 
presence of the oil companies.  
The liberal and utilitarian approach of monetizing the value of 
property also failed during the negotiations between the companies and 
the tribes in 2000, when CGC offered up to $60,000 for development 
projects, to provide 500 jobs for men in the community, and to send a 
medical team to provide care in several communities.252  Again, this is 
an economic compensation approach to the loss of property.  These 
efforts failed because the Sarayaku tribe council felt that they did not 
reflect the actual loss inflicted on the community.253   
 
 251 Sarayaku Merits and Reparations, supra note 87, ¶ 23 (June 27, 2012) (emphasis 
added). 
 252 Id. ¶¶ 73–74. 
 253 Id. 
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ii.  The IACtHR’s Decision and Reparations 
In June 2012, the IACtHR issued its decision, finding Ecuador in 
violation of the Sarayaku people’s right to consultation.  The decision 
was groundbreaking for considering the cultural, social, and 
environmental relations generated by property rights.254  But, as 
explained below, it did not fully escape the liberal and utilitarian 
conception of property rights recognized in international treaties.  As 
explained previously, tribal rights must work within the internationally 
recognized conception of rights to protect their lands, and as such, 
continue to be subject to the monetization of their property’s value.  
For example, the IACtHR begins its analysis of property rights by 
recognizing that a classical and textual reading of Article 21 of the 
American Convention—the right to property—does not capture the 
“close relationships between indigenous people and their lands, and 
with the natural resources on their ancestral territories and the 
intangible element arising from these.”255  Rather, Article 21, to 
adequately protect indigenous lands, must be interpreted as a living 
instrument that includes notions of land ownership and possession that 
do not necessarily conform to classic conceptions of property.256  The 
State must take into consideration indigenous culture, practices, 
customs, and beliefs; otherwise, there would only be one way to think 
about the use and disposal of the property—the liberal and utilitarian 
conception.  To properly protect indigenous property, we must ensure 
that communities can continue their traditional way of living.257  In this 
respect, the IACtHR decision is in line with the arguments presented in 
previous Sections.  
  
 
 254 See Anaya & Puig, supra note 20. 
 255 Sarayaku, Merits and Reparations, supra note 87, ¶ 145. 
 256 Id. 
 257 Id. ¶ 146. 
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In this light, the IACtHR extended the right of consultation into its 
communal view of the right to property.258  For example, the State must 
consult the communities during the early stages of the development 
plan, and not when the project is already underway.259 In doing so, the 
State must consult the communities in an active and informed manner, 
and in accordance with the indigenous communities’ customs and 
traditions.260  In addition, the State must conduct the consultation 
process with the aim of reaching an agreement and ensure that the 
communities are aware of the potential benefits and risks.261  
According to the IACtHR, in the case of the Sarayaku tribe, Ecuador 
and the company failed to fulfill the above requirements as established 
by the right of consultation.262  It was the obligation of the State, not the 
company, to comply with these steps.  According to the court, the State 
cannot delegate its duties to the private company or third parties.263  As 
such, even if the company had lines of communication with the 
communities and engaged in negotiations that resulted in some 
agreements and the socialization of the project, the court held that those 
efforts would not be enough.  Moreover, the fact that the State had 
delegated its duties was a breach of its international responsibility.264  
The IACtHR described the company’s efforts to engage with the 
communities and the presence of government officials in the area to 
prevent violent spikes as efforts to benefit the companies as opposed to 
the communities.265  The presence of military forces appears to 
 
 258 Id. ¶ 177 (“The Court has established that in order to ensure the effective 
participation of the members of an indigenous community or people in development or 
investment plans within their territory, the State has the obligation to consult the said 
community in an active and informed manner, in accordance with its customs and 
traditions, within the framework of continuing communication between the parties.  
Furthermore, the consultations must be undertaken in good faith, using culturally-
appropriate procedures and must be aimed at reaching an agreement.  In addition, the 
people or community must be consulted in accordance with their own traditions, during 
the early stages of the development or investment plan, and not only when it is 
necessary to obtain the community’s approval, if appropriate.  The State must also 
ensure that the members of the people or the community are aware of the potential 
benefits and risks so they can decide whether to accept the proposed development or 
investment plan.  Finally, the consultation must take into account the traditional 
decision-making practices of the people or community.  Failure to comply with this 
obligation, or engaging in consultations without observing their essential 
characteristics, entails the State’s international responsibility.”). 
 259 Id. 
 260 Id. 
 261 Sarayaku Merits and Reparations, supra note 87, ¶ 177. 
 262 Id. ¶ 223. 
 263 Id. ¶ 187. 
 264 Id. ¶ 188. 
 265 Id. ¶ 190–98. 
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encourage a climate of conflict and division.  These efforts resemble 
confrontation rather than attempts to prevent further clashes.266  As 
such, the IACtHR completely ignored the fact that the companies 
complained to the government that the communities were perpetrating 
violence and damaging their property.267  As the next subsection will 
show, foreign direct investors viewed the same acts that the IACtHR 
described as designed to protect the companies as inadequate 
protection under the investment treaties.268  
The IACtHR considered that Ecuador, almost twelve years after the 
signing of the contracts with foreign companies and ten years after the 
ratification of ILO Convention No. 169, passed a constitutional 
amendment to recognize the right to consultation.  Article 57 of the 2008 
Ecuadorian Constitution recognizes indigenous communities in 
conformity with human rights agreements, including their “collective 
rights” to “keep ownership, without subject to a statute of limitations, of 
their community lands, which shall be unalienable, immune from 
seizure and indivisible”; “[t]o keep ownership of ancestral lands and 
territories”; and to “participate in the use, usufruct, administration and 
conservation of natural renewable resources located on their lands.”269  
Notwithstanding its recognition of the communal rights and the cultural 
and collective nature of the indigenous lands, Article 57 clearly 
identifies monetary compensation as the primary method to remedy 
any damage to indigenous lands connected to infrastructure projects.  
The wording of Article 57 is clear on this point.  Indigenous communities 
have collective rights to 
free prior informed consultation, within a reasonable period 
of time, on the plans and programs for prospecting, producing 
and marketing nonrenewable resources located on their lands 
and which could have an environmental or cultural impact on 
them; to participate in the profits earned from these projects 
and to receive compensation for social, cultural and 
environmental damages caused to them. . . .  If consent of the 
consulted community is not obtained, steps provided for by 
the Constitution and the law shall be taken.270 
 
 
 266 Id. 
 267 Sarayaku Merits and Reparations, supra note 87, ¶ 190–98. 
 268 Id. 
 269 República del Ecuador, Constitucion de 2008, art. 57, ¶¶ 5–7, translated in POL. 
DATABASE OF THE AM., http://pdba.georgetown.edu/Constitutions/Ecuador/english
08.html (last updated Jan. 31, 2011).   
 270 Id. ¶ 7 (emphasis added). 
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Article 57 was implemented by Decree No. 1247, which was 
adopted a month after the IACtHR published its decision finding 
Ecuador in violation of the American Convention.271  The decree 
establishes the steps for considering whether the right of consultation 
was properly respected by the Ministry of Hydrocarbons.  It specifies 
the type of “social programs” that can be offered in the process of 
consulting the communities, the actors that must be involved in the 
process, and the certification of the consultation process.  But the decree 
clearly specifies that the process would not be considered null or invalid 
if the communities decide not to exercise their right to participate in the 
consultation.272  Only the Ministry has a duty to initiate and follow the 
steps in the law, but it should not be confused with a veto on the project.  
If the communities decide not to approve the project or to participate in 
the offered social programs as compensation, the Ministry’s only 
obligation is to record that and set up a contingency plan.  The decree 
also excludes all previous licenses and contracts signed by the State 
from the obligation to conduct a consultation process according to 
Article 57. 
As pecuniary damages, the court ordered the State to pay 
$90,000.273  It took into consideration all the expenses incurred by the 
tribes in defending their rights, the territory and natural resources 
damages, and the effects of the suspension of production activities on 
the communities’ financial situation.274  The court also ordered the 
payment of $1.25 million to compensate the community for the impacts 
involving their spiritual relationship with their territory and spiritual 
sites.275  Finally, to ensure nonrepetition of the actions, the court 
ordered the State to: 
1.  Remove any remaining explosives on the sites;276 
2.  Implement adequate legislation ensuring that any future 
project involving the ancestral land of the Sarayaku would be 
subject to an effective consultation process as defined by the 
court;277 and 
 
 271 Decreto núm. 1247 que dicta el reglamento para la ejecución de la consulta previa 
libre e informada en los procesos de licitación y asignación de áreas y bloques 
hidrocarburíferos, INT’L LABOUR ORG., https://www.ilo.org/dyn/natlex/natlex4.detail?
p_lang=en&p_isn=98181&p_country=ECU&p_count=383 (last visited Jan. 24, 2020) 
[hereinafter Ecuador Decree No. 1247]. 
 272 Id. at Art. 19 & 20. 
 273 Sarayaku Merits and Reparations, supra note 87, ¶ 317. 
 274 Id. ¶¶ 316–17  
 275 Id. ¶¶ 322–23. 
 276 Id. ¶¶ 289–95. 
 277 Id. ¶¶ 296–302. 
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3.  Conduct a public act of acknowledgment of international 
responsibility.278 
As noted, these measures do not escape the tendency to favor a 
monetization of indigenous property.  The consultation process, even if 
it is done following all the elements described by the court, ends up 
leading to a monetization of the value of the property that leaves the 
communities on the wrong side of the equation.  Even in its decision, the 
court recognized that as it was drafting its resolution, the State, 
following its new amended constitution and legislation, was still 
opening bidding rounds on indigenous lands.  The court acknowledged 
that it did not need “to rule on new oil bidding rounds that the State may 
have initiated,” and reaffirmed that the State “should seek to carry out 
activities or projects for the exploration or extraction of resources,” 
making sure that the Sarayaku people are “previously, adequately and 
effectively consulted, in full compliance with the relevant international 
standards.”279  As explained above, the standard does not provide a 
solution to projects that will ultimately affect the communities and their 
relationship to their territories.   
iii.  The ICSID Proceedings 
On April 21st, 2008, as the Sarayaku people were presenting their 
case in the Inter-American Commission of Human Rights, Burlington 
Resources was filing a request for arbitration against Ecuador with the 
ICSID.280  Burlington’s claims involved not only the lack of protection by 
the Ecuadorian government from the indigenous community’s 
intervention into the company’s operations but also the changes in the 
tax legislation and violation of stabilization clauses in the contracts.281  
The company requested the arbitral tribunal to order $1.5 billion in 
compensation for the breach of Ecuador’s treaty obligations.   
The ICSID arbitral tribunal that reviewed the case, in the end, 
dismissed the company’s claims for failure to afford full protection and 
security in the project on procedural grounds.282  Accordingly, the 
 
 278 Id. ¶¶ 303–05. 
 279 Sarayaku Merits and Reparations, supra note 87, ¶ 299. 
 280 Burlington Res. Inc. v. Ecuador, ICSID Case No. ARB/08/5, Decision on 
Jurisdiction, ¶ 53 (June 2, 2010). 
 281 Id. ¶ 26 (“The dispute between the Parties arises out of the following two factual 
scenarios: (1) Ecuador’s purported failure to protect Burlington’s exploration and 
exploitation activities in Blocks 23 and 24 from local indigenous opposition, and (2) 
Ecuador’s enactment of measures which, purportedly in breach of its contractual and 
Treaty obligations, unilaterally increased its participation under the PSCs on so-called 
‘unforeseen surpluses.”). 
 282 Id. ¶¶ 316–18.  The tribunal argued that the company was required to notify the 
State of the existence of dispute regarding the lack of full protection and security, and, 
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tribunal did not assess whether indigenous interests had any role to 
play regarding the substantive issues or the proceedings.283  
Notwithstanding the dismissal, the company’s claims are a perfect 
example of the clash of internationally protected rights that arise from 
prioritizing the economic value of property over its social component. 
According to Burlington,  Ecuador’s breach of the full protection 
and security standard originated in Ecuador’s “failure to protect 
Burlington’s exploration and exploitation activities in Blocks 23 and 24 
from the indigenous oppositions.”284  The company’s recounting of the 
facts included the several occasions in which the indigenous 
intervention forced the company to declare the Blocks in force majeure 
partly due to the communities’ opposition, but also due to the 
communities “violent attacks and death threats.”285  Moreover, it 
described the failure of the Ecuadorian government in assisting with the 
negotiations with the communities and exercising its police powers, 
forcing the company to maintain the force majeure status of its 
operations.286  
As evidence, Burlington submitted a letter from 2002 where CGC, 
the operator of Block 23, requested the government’s assistance to 
“intercede with its good offices, and take the measures [it] deem[ed] 
necessary, with the purpose of ensuring that the Armed Forces and the 
National Police w[ould] act resolutely to procure the liberation of the 
hostages, as well as to facilitate the execution of the ongoing seismic 
project. . . .  [I]t is the duty of the Ecuadorian State, and PetroEcuador in 
a particular, to guarantee the safety of the operations, as stated in our 
contractual agreement and under appropriate constitutional norms.”287  
As stated by the ICSID tribunal, the “tone and the context of the letter do 
manifest a disagreement over rights and obligations.”288  The same plea 
was made again in 2005, stating that the company had “not managed to 
secure [Petroecuador] and the energy authorities’ effective intervention 
in order to overcome the obstacles underlying the force majeure 
situation. . . .  [I]t is the duty of the Ecuadorian State, through its police 
power, to adopt the necessary measures to guarantee the security of its 
 
according to its interpretation of the communications between the company and the 
State, to deal with the indigenous communities opposition, these could not be 
considered as triggering the required notification prior to the initiation of arbitral 
proceedings.   
 283 Id. 
 284 Id. 
 285 Id. ¶¶ 27–31, 35. 
 286 Burlington Res. Inc., ICSID Case No. ARB/08/5, Decision on Jurisdiction, ¶¶ 32–37. 
 287 Id. ¶ 319.  
 288 Id. ¶ 320. 
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citizens in the territory.”289  The letters were accompanied with 
evidence of the damages suffered as a result of the security situation in 
the Blocks.  
The facts, described by Burlington as grounds for Ecuador’s breach 
of investment law obligations, are an example of the dynamic that 
emerges when the State is pushed on both sides of the equation to 
provide protection against the other party.  
Ecuador did not contest the facts pertaining to the lack of 
protection of the company’s operations.  The government’s position was 
that the tribunal lacked jurisdiction to resolve the merits of the claim 
because Burlington had failed to abide by a six-month waiting period 
contemplated in the Treaty, and that Ecuador withdrew its consent to 
resolve this type of dispute before Burlington brought them to 
arbitration.290 
According to the Treaty Between the United States of America and 
the Republic of Ecuador Concerning the Encouragement and Reciprocal 
Protection of Investment (“Ecuador-U.S. BIT”), investors must wait six 
months before bringing a treaty claim to an investment tribunal.291  To 
Ecuador, there was never a disagreement between the government and 
Burlington concerning the indigenous opposition in Blocks 23 and 24; 
even if there was, Burlington never provided proper notice of it, and 
hence did not comply with the six-month waiting period.292  In fact, the 
government argued that Ecuador and Burlington, by accepting the force 
majeure status, recognized that the events in question were beyond the 
parties’ control, and in fact “‘there was a clear collaboration between 
[the government and the company] to solve the issue’ in the Blocks 
concerning the indigenous opposition.”293  In other words, the 
government recognized that it had been cooperating with the 
companies, and did not deny that the opposition from the communities 
existed.  
 
 289 Id. ¶ 323. 
 290 Id. ¶ 95(iv) (“Burlington’s claim that Ecuador allegedly failed to provide full 
protection and security for Blocks 23 and 24 is outside the jurisdiction of the Tribunal 
because: (a) Burlington failed to abide by the six-month waiting period, a condition for 
consent under the Treaty; (b) Burlington failed to perfect consent before Ecuador 
withdrew its offer to arbitrate this class of disputes pursuant to its declaration under 
Article 25(4) of the ICSID Convention.”) 
 291 Treaty Concerning the Encouragement and Reciprocal Protection of Investment, 
Ecuador-U.S., Aug. 27, 1993, S. TREATY DOC. NO. 103-15 (1993), at Article VI.3(a). 
 292 Burlington Res. Inc., ICSID Case No. ARB/08/5, Decision on Jurisdiction, ¶ 255, 
258. 
 293 Id. ¶ 257. 
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Ultimately, the ICSID tribunal dismissed the “full protection and 
security” claims on procedural grounds.  It found that the companies 
had not provided the government adequate notice of the existence of the 
dispute of a treaty claim and failed to comply with the six-month cooling 
period required by the Treaty before bringing the claim to arbitration.294  
But, as stated above, the tribunal accepted Burlington’s classification of 
the indigenous resistance as a force majeure that was outside the 
control of the company and prevented it from fulfilling its contractual 
obligations.295  The ICSID tribunal did not assess the company’s role in 
the failed consultation process with the communities.296  The indigenous 
communities and their rights were treated as externalities in the 
process.297  
Ecuador was found liable for unlawfully expropriating Burlington’s 
investments through the enactment of the new taxation regime.298  
Before the tribunal calculated damages, Ecuador filed counterclaims 
against Burlington for breaching its environmental obligations under 
the contracts.  Ultimately, the quantification of damages was reduced to 
the environmental impact on the sites where the oil wells were 
operating, but the decision made no mention of the communities.299  The 
ICSID tribunal relied exclusively on Ecuadorian environmental law to 
determine the quantification of damages owed to the Ecuadorian State 
and completely ignored the communities’ grievances.300  In the end, 
Ecuador was ordered to pay $380 million for the actions taken against 
Burlington, while, as mentioned above, in the IACtHR, the State only paid 
the communities $1.38 million.301 
 
 294 Id. ¶¶ 335–40. 
 295 Id. ¶ 34. 
 296 Binder & Hofbuer, supra note 209, at 8. 
 297 Id. 
 298 Burlington Res. Inc. v. Republic of Ecuador, ICSID Case No. ARB/08/5, Decision on 
Liability, ¶¶ 541–46 (Dec. 14, 2012).   
 299 Matthew Levine, Ecuador Awarded USD41 Million in Counterclaim Against U.S. Oil 
and Gas Company Burlington Resources, INV. TREATY NEWS (Sept. 26, 2017), 
https://www.iisd.org/itn/2017/09/26/ecuador-awarded-41-million-counterclaim-
against-u-s-oil-gas-company-burlington-resources-matthew-levine. 
 300 Burlington Res. Inc. v. Republic of Ecuador, ICSID Case No. ARB/08/5, Decision on 
Counterclaims, ¶¶ 48, 116, 328 (Feb. 7, 2017).  The Tribunal only mentioned in its 
decision that communities lived in Block 21, but there was no mention of the case before 
the IACtHRs or the actions taken against the indigenous communities. 
 301 The IACtHR awarded US$90,000 for pecuniary damages and US$1,250,000.00 as 
compensation for non-pecuniary damage.  Sarayaku, Merits and Reparations, supra 
note 87, ¶¶ 317, 323. 
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B.  Oil from Canada and North American Tribes: Keystone XL 
The effect of energy infrastructure in tribal land is not unique to 
developing nations.  The United States, for example, is no stranger to 
questions surrounding the clash between indigenous communities and 
foreign investors.302  In three of the seventeen investment arbitration 
cases in which the United States was a respondent, issues surrounding 
indigenous people’s right to be consulted or land being affected by 
foreign investors were brought up in the proceedings.303  The case 
described below is the latest U.S. example of how investors have an 
international recourse that prioritizes the quantification of damages 
when communities’ protests affect their investments.304  But 
communities are left with remedies that force them to fit their 
conceptions of property into the liberal and utilitarian paradigm, and 
hence, leave them on the wrong side of the equation.   
  
 
 302 See, e.g., Glamis Gold Ltd v. United States, supra note 128; Grand River Enterprises 
Six Nations, Ltd., et al. v. United States of America, supra note 128.  For executive orders 
seeking to address the consultation process with indigenous communities, see Pres. 
George W. Bush, Executive, Memorandum: Government-to-Government Relationship 
with Tribal Governments, Sept. 23, 2004; Pres. William J. Clinton, Executive Order 
13175, Nov. 6, 2000 (consultation and coordination with tribal governments); Pres. 
Barack Obama, Memorandum for the Heads of Executive Departments and Agencies—
Tribal Consultation, Nov. 5, 2009. 
 303 For a complete list of cases in which the U.S. has been a respondent, see United 
States of America, Investment Dispute Settlement Navigator, UNCTAD INV. POL’Y HUB, 
https://investmentpolicy.unctad.org/investment-dispute-settlement/country/223/
united-states-of-america/respondent (last visited Mar 6, 2021).  The three cases 
involving indigenous communities and foreign investors in the United States are Glamis 
Gold Ltd v. United States, supra note 128, Grand River Enterprises Six Nations, Ltd., et al. 
v. United States, supra note 128; and TransCanada Corp. v. United States, Notice of Intent 
to Submit a Claim to Arbitration Under Chapter 11 of the North American Free Trade 
Agreement (Jan. 6, 2016), http://www.energylawprof.com/wp-content/uploads/
2016/01/TransCanada-Notice-of-Intent-January-6-2016.pdf [hereinafter Notice of 
Intent to Submit a Claim to Arbitration Under Chapter 11 of the NAFTA]. 
 304 This Article was written between October 2019 and January 2021.  The Biden 
administration’s decision was included during the editing process of the Article.  As 
such, it does not include any analysis of the TransCanada case after January 2021.   
GARCIA SANCHEZ (DO NOT DELETE) 4/21/2021  5:43 PM 
2021] DRILLS AND PIPELINES CROSS INDIGENOUS LANDS 1179 
1.  A Politicized Keystone 
On November 3rd, 2015, White House Press Secretary Josh Earnest 
stated, “I would venture to say that there’s probably no infrastructure 
project in the history of the United States that’s been as politicized as 
[the Keystone Pipeline].”305  As the next paragraphs will show, President 
Obama’s Press Secretary was far from wrong when he described the 
permit process of the Keystone XL pipeline.  
The politicization of the project began with the existing legal 
framework for issuing transboundary pipeline permits.306  In the U.S., 
the executive branch has traditionally issued Executive Orders 
establishing a process for issuing permits to pipelines crossing into the 
United States that would serve national interests.307  As Professor James 
Coleman pointed out in his work, Congress has not provided a legal 
framework regulating the issuance of such permits, and in the absence 
of express Congressional authorization, presidents all the way back to 
Lyndon B. Johnson have taken unilateral action to decide when and 
under what circumstances cross-border permits are issued.308 
In 2008, TransCanada Keystone Pipeline LP applied to the U.S. 
Department of State for a Presidential Permit to build a pipeline to carry 
crude oil from Canada to the United States.309  When TransCanada filed 
for the Keystone XL permit, there was plenty of precedent suggesting 
that the pipeline would be approved.310  In fact, this was not the first 
time oil from the Canadian province of Alberta was being transported 
via pipeline to ease the demand for fuel in America.311  The petition itself 
was no different from at least three previously granted permits to carry 
 
 305 Press Briefing by Press Secretary Josh Earnest, WHITE HOUSE (Nov. 3, 2015), 
https://obamawhitehouse.archives.gov/the-press-office/2015/11/03/press-briefing-
press-secretary-josh-earnest-1132015. 
 306 James Coleman, TransCanada Sues U.S. Government for Rejecting Keystone 
Pipelines, U. OF CALGARY FAC. OF L. BLOG (Jan. 11, 2016), https://ablawg.ca/2016/01/11/
transcanada-sues-u-s-government-for-rejecting-keystone-pipelines. 
 307 See Coleman, Beyond the Pipeline Wars, supra note 22, at 135. 
 308 Coleman, supra note 306 (describing how Congress had not provided a legal 
framework for regulating oil pipelines that cross the U.S. international borders and how 
“[i]n the absence of Congressional authorization, President Lyndon Baines Johnson 
simply issued an executive order in 1968, Executive Order 11423, that established a 
process for issuing permits to proposed oil pipelines that ‘would serve the national 
interests.’ Then in 2004, President George W. Bush issued a new unilateral order, 
Executive Order 13337 that expedited review of border crossings.  Both executive 
orders delegate decisions on these cross-border permits to the U.S. Secretary of State.”). 
 309 Coleman, Beyond the Pipeline Wars, supra note 22, at 120–21. 
 310 Notice of Intent to Submit a Claim to Arbitration Under Chapter 11 of the NAFTA, 
supra note 303, ¶ 1. 
 311 Id. 
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oil from the same location.312  Keystone XL was intended to increase the 
capacity of the existing system to process 168 billion barrels of tar sands 
oil.313  It would transport around 830,000 barrels across the United 
States to refineries on the Gulf Coast of Texas.314  Notwithstanding the 
immense similarities, however, Keystone XL differed from previous 
petitions in one glaring way: environmental groups and Native 
American tribes opposed the expansion of the system.315  
Leaders of the Fort Peck Assiniboine and Sioux tribes of the Fort 
Peck Reservation and the Cheyenne River tribe openly opposed the 
pipeline.316  The opposition can be credited to the following: The 
Keystone XL “would cross less than 100 miles from the headquarters of 
the Fort Belknap Indian Reservation and run directly through sacred 
and historical sites as well as the ancestral lands of the Gros Ventre and 
Assiniboine Tribes.”317  Moreover, the pipeline would cross the two 
water sources for the Mni Wiconi Rural Water Supply Project, a water 
delivery system owned and operated by the Rosebud Sioux Tribe.318  In 
the words of the Native American Rights Fund: “[t]here are countless 
historical, cultural, and religious sites in the planned path of the pipeline 
that are at risk of destruction, both by the pipeline’s construction and by 
the threat of inevitable ruptures and spills if the pipeline becomes 
operational.”319  These tribes also participated in the protests of their 
neighboring tribe, the Standing Rock, who opposed the construction of 
the Dakota Access pipeline that would bring shale oil from the Bakken 
formation in North Dakota to an oil terminal in Patoka, Illinois.320  
Together the Sioux, Cheyenne, and Standing Rock tribes established 
 
 312 Id. 
 313 Melissa Denchak, What Is the Keystone Pipeline?, NAT. RES. DEF. COUNCIL (Apr. 7, 
2017), https://www.nrdc.org/stories/what-keystone-pipeline. 
 314 Id. 
 315 Notice of Intent to Submit a Claim to Arbitration Under Chapter 11 of the NAFTA, 
supra note 303, ¶ 1; Denchak, supra note 313; see also Coleman, Beyond the Pipeline 
Wars, supra note 22, at 121–24. 
 316 Phil McKenna, ‘We Will Be Waiting’: Tribe Says Keystone XL Construction Is Not 
Welcome, INSIDE CLIMATE NEWS (July 13, 2018), https://insideclimatenews.org/news/13
072018/keystone-xl-pipeline-native-american-resistance-oil-spill-cheyenne-river-
sioux-dakota-access-transcanada; Keystone XL Pipeline, NATIVE AM. RIGHTS FUND, 
https://www.narf.org/cases/keystone/ (last visited Jan. 16, 2020). 
 317 Vanessa Romo, Native American Tribes File Lawsuit Seeking to Invalidate Keystone 
XL Pipeline Permit, NPR (Sept. 10, 2018), https://www.npr.org/2018/09/10/64652
3140/native-american-tribes-file-lawsuit-seeking-to-invalidate-keystone-xl-pipeline-
p; Keystone XL Pipeline, supra note 316. 
 318 Keystone XL Pipeline, supra note 316. 
 319 Id. 
 320 McKenna, supra note 316. 
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semi-permanent camps near where the pipelines would cross under the 
Missouri River, just upstream from the reservations.321  
It was in the context of these social protests, both the 
environmental and the tribal, in which Secretary of State John Kerry 
denied the Keystone XL permit in 2015.322  The White House’s argument 
for denying the permit involved U.S. national interests.  The Obama 
administration felt that U.S. leadership could be undercut in the ongoing 
climate talks because the pipeline was “perceived as enabling further 
[greenhouse gas] emissions globally.”323  In other words, the expansion 
of a pipeline that would funnel billions of barrels of one of the “dirtiest” 
crudes in the world into American refineries would contradict the goal 
of reducing “dirty” oil consumption.324  Environmental and tribal 
activists leaders were successful in their campaign against the 
construction of the pipeline.325  
2.  TransCanada’s NAFTA Claims Against the U.S. 
The Keystone Pipeline odyssey did not cease with the permit 
denial.  In January 2016, TransCanada filed a notice of intent to submit 
an international investment claim to arbitration under NAFTA’s Chapter 
XI.  The company alleged that President Obama’s decision to cancel the 
permit violated “core investment protections, including national 
treatment (Article 1102), most-favored-nation treatment (Article 
1103), treatment in accordance with international law (Article 1105), 
and protection against uncompensated expropriations (Article 110).”326  
To the Canadian investors, the President based his decision not on the 
merits of Keystone’s application but on “politically-driven” factors that 
violated U.S. obligations under NAFTA.327  
 
 321 Id. 
 322 See Notice of Intent to Submit a Claim to Arbitration Under Chapter 11 of the 
NAFTA, supra note 303, ¶ 6. 
 323 U.S. DEP’T OF STATE, RECORD OF DECISION AND NATIONAL INTEREST DETERMINATION 29 
(2015), http://www.energylawprof.com/wp-content/uploads/2016/01/KeystoneXL
.Record-of-Decision.pdf [hereinafter 2015 U.S. DEP’T OF STATE DETERMINATION] (The 
determination stated that “While the proposed Project by itself is unlikely to 
significantly impact the level of GHG-intensive extraction of oil sands crude or the 
continued demand for heavy crude oil at refineries in the United States, it is critical for 
the United States to prioritize actions that are not perceived as enabling further GHG 
emissions globally”); Coleman, Beyond the Pipeline Wars, supra note 22, at 122. 
 324 See Denchak, supra note 313. 
 325 See Notice of Intent to Submit a Claim to Arbitration Under Chapter 11 of the 
NAFTA, supra note 303, ¶ 6. 
 326 Id. ¶ 8. 
 327 Id. ¶ 1. 
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In their notice of intent, TransCanada insisted that the government 
misled them into investing in the U.S. while the permit was pending 
approval.328  As such, the company had legitimate expectations that the 
project would move forward, and consequently began initial works on 
the south end of the pipeline, “secure[d] thousands of land easements, 
purchase[d] equipment[,] . . . and enter[ed] into long-term contracts 
with shippers to transport the[ir] oil.”329  By misleading TransCanada 
into investing in the project and yielding to the protesters and 
environmental activists, the Obama administration had breached the 
minimum standard of treatment of aliens including fair and equitable 
treatment and full protection and security. 
TransCanada grounded its contention on the fact that the State 
Department’s 2015 determination concluded that the pipeline would 
improve U.S. energy security, benefit the economy, and would be 
unlikely to increase greenhouse emissions in Canada.330  In fact, the 
report suggested that by moving the transportation of oil to a pipeline 
instead of railroads, the project would reduce emissions in the United 
States.331  Under TransCanada’s views, “there was nothing unusual 
about the proposed pipeline or the oil it was intended to carry.”332  The 
administration had approved similar projects from the same company 
in the past (Keystone I pipeline), taking approximately twenty-seven 
months or less to approve the permits.333  In the case of Keystone XL, the 
refusal took seven years due to the pressures exerted by activists and 
environmental groups, turning opposition to the Keystone XL “into a 
litmus test for politicians.”334  
 
 328 Id. ¶ 2 (“TransCanada Corporation (‘TransCanada’) and TransCanada PipeLines 
Limited (collectively the ‘Disputing Investors’) through their affiliates, including 
Keystone, invested billions of dollars in the pipeline project while the Keystone XL 
Pipeline application was pending, all with the reasonable expectation that the 
Administration would process Keystone’s application fairly and consistently with past 
actions.”). 
 329 Id. ¶ 2. 
 330 Id. ¶ ¶ 46–49; see also 2015 U.S. DEP’T OF STATE DETERMINATION supra note 323, 
at 29–31. 
 331 2015 U.S. DEP’T OF STATE DETERMINATION, supra note 323, at 23 (“With regard to GHG 
emissions, during operation of the No Action Alternative transportation scenarios, 
including rail and combination modes, the increased number of trains along the rail 
routes would produce GHG emissions from diesel fuel combustion and electricity 
generation to support terminal operations.  Annual GHG emissions (direct and indirect) 
attributed to the No Action transportation scenarios would be greater than for the 
proposed Project, but those emissions relate solely to the movement of equivalent 
amounts of oil from Alberta to the Gulf Coast.”) 
 332 Notice of Intent to Submit a Claim to Arbitration Under Chapter 11 of the NAFTA, 
supra note 303, ¶ 1. 
 333 Id. ¶ 10. 
 334 Id. ¶¶ 1, 11. 
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Moreover, TransCanada argued that the U.S. government, during 
the seven years in which the permit was pending, looked very carefully 
into the state-level litigation and required easements.335  The federal 
government “worked with Keystone to develop at least [fifty-seven] 
changes to the proposed pipeline project to ensure that the pipeline 
would be built and operated in a manner that would protect health, 
safety, the environment, and local communities.”336   
Consequently, to TransCanada, the denial of the permit was solely 
based on “perceived” negative effects on the communities and the 
environment, not proven or documented effects that contradicted the 
State Department’s previous findings.337  To TransCanada, the only 
reason behind the decision was to appease the protesters and activists 
who held a “false” belief.338  
After the filing of TransCanada’s notice of intent, an ICSID-
administered proceeding against the United States was registered on 
July 15, 2016.339  The total damages requested by TransCanada for 
breach of the U.S.’s  NAFTA obligations amounted to $15 billion.340  In 
late 2016, the U.S. and Canada appointed their arbitrators, David R. 
Haigh and Sean David Murphy.341  In early February 2017, the ICSID 
Secretary was about to initiate proceedings to select the president of the 
Tribunal when the parties agreed to suspend the proceedings for one 
month.  Donald J. Trump had been sworn in as the forty-fifth President 




 335 Id. ¶ 2. 
 336 Id. ¶ 2. 
 337 Id. ¶ 7. 
 338 Notice of Intent to Submit a Claim to Arbitration Under Chapter 11 of the NAFTA, 
supra note 303, ¶ 7. 
 339 TransCanada Corp. v. United States, ICSID Case No. ARB/16/21, Order of the 
Secretary-General Taking Note of the Discontinuance of the Proceeding, ¶ 2 (Mar. 24, 
2017).  
 340 The Canadian Press, TransCanada Suspends $15-Billion NAFTA Suit on Keystone XL 
Pipeline, STAR (Feb. 28, 2017), https://www.thestar.com/business/2017/02/28/
transcanada-suspends-15-billion-nafta-suit-on-keystone-xl-pipeline.html. 
 341 See TransCanda Corp., ICSID Case No. ARB/16/21, Order of the Secretary-General 
Taking Note of the Discontinuance of the Proceeding, at ¶ 4. 
 342 See The Canadian Press, supra note 340.  
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3.  The Trump Administration and the Case Before the Inter-
American Commission on Human Rights 
Environmentalists and tribe members had opposed the pipeline for 
eight years, but it took four full days on the job for President Trump to 
sign an executive action inviting TransCanada to resubmit the 
controversial proposal.343  The Executive Order instructed the newly 
appointed Secretary of State and former chief executive of ExxonMobil, 
Rex Tillerson, to make a decision on the proposal within sixty days of 
receiving the application.344  On March 23, 2017, the U.S. Department of 
State granted TransCanada’s permit application, reversing the previous 
administration’s decision.  Suddenly, the pipeline’s environmental 
effects and impacts on communities had no weight in the process.  The 
seven-year odyssey under one administration was seemingly resolved 
in only fifty-six days by the newly elected president.  The NAFTA claim 
was discontinued upon TransCanada’s request the same day that the 
Trump administration approved the permit.345  
It is no surprise that the tribes and activists complained of the 
Trump administration’s lack of explanation for why the previous 
administration’s factual findings were discarded.346  According to the 
tribes,  
throughout the permitting process, there was no analysis of 
trust obligations, no analysis of treaty rights, no analysis of the 
potential impact on hunting and fishing rights, no analysis of 
potential impacts on the Rosebud Sioux Tribe’s unique water 
system, no analysis of the potential impact of spills on tribal 
citizens, and no analysis of the potential impact on cultural 
sights in the path of the pipeline.347 
The same week that the permit was approved, the Inter-American 
Commission held a hearing with the tribes on the effects of expedited 
environmental reviews and approval for high-priority infrastructure 
projects (mainly the Dakota Access and Keystone XL pipelines) on tribal 
 
 343 Daniel Dale, Trump Signs Order to Quickly Approve Keystone Pipeline, Trudeau 
Applauds, STAR (Jan. 24, 2017), https://www.thestar.com/news/world/2017/01/24/
trump-to-advance-controversial-keystone-xl-dakota-access-oil-pipelines.html. 
 344 Id. 
 345 TransCanda Corp., ICSID Case No. ARB/16/21, Order of the Secretary-General 
Taking Note of the Discontinuance of the Proceeding, at ¶ 10. 
 346 Letter from Rodney M. Bordeaux, President of South Dakota Rosebud Sioux Tribe, 
to Rosebud Sioux Tribe Community (Sept. 10, 2018), https://www.narf.org/wordpress/
wp-content/uploads/2017/09/20180910bordeaux-letter.pdf. 
 347 Natalie A. Landreth et al., Keystone XL Pipeline, Case Updates, NATIVE AM. RIGHTS 
FUND, https://www.narf.org/cases/keystone (last updated Nov. 17, 2020). 
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and community rights in the U.S.348  In the hearing, tribe leaders shared 
with the Commission facts that reflected harassment from the U.S. 
federal government and a lack of a previous informed consultation 
process with the communities.349  
As explained in previous subsections, the communities’ 
relationships with the land cannot be quantified in monetary terms.350  
As President Bordeaux of the Rosebud Sioux Tribe explained in a letter 
to the community after the Trump administration’s reversal of the 
permit decision, the tribes “have an inherent obligation to protect the 
health and wellbeing of [their] members as well as the health and 
welfare of Unci Maka (mother earth).” 351  To the tribes, “the land, the 
water, the air, and the Lakota People [(the seven Sioux tribes)] are one 
in the same.”352  
TransCanada tried to engage with the tribe leaders, offering to 
“create opportunities for an open dialogue” and “discuss potential 
opportunities for participation in the project.”353  Alas, the company’s 
answer was ultimately the monetization of property rights.  From the 
company’s perspective, access to tribal lands depended on sharing some 
of the projects’ economic benefits with them.  In response, the tribal 
leaders answered with a resounding, “You are not welcome on our 
territory TransCanada.”354 
In late 2018 and early 2019, the tribes filed several federal lawsuits 
opposing the Trump administration’s decision.355  A judge for the United 
States District Court for the District of Montana repeatedly blocked 
TransCanada’s attempts to start construction.356  The courts’ reasoning 
mainly relied on U.S domestic law: the lack of public notice; the lack of 
required environmental and safety review by the State Department; the 
 
 348 Inter-American Commission Hearing on U.S. Executive Orders Before the Inter-
American Commission on Human Rights, INT’L JUST. RES. CTR. (Mar. 21, 2017), 
https://ijrcenter.org/inter-american-commission-hearing-executive-orders-travel-
ban-environmental-review/. 
 349 Miller, supra note 20 (explaining how the right of consultation in international 
treaties is also consistent with the spirit of the U.S. federal government and tribal 
relations treaties and legislation). 
 350 Supra Section II.A.   
 351 Bordeaux, supra note 346. 
 352 Id. 
 353 McKenna, supra note 316 (referring to the letter sent by TransCanada to Tribal 
Chairman Harold Frazier which was exposed on his twitter account); CRST Chairman 
(@CRSTChairman), TWITTER (JUL. 12, 2018, 7:02 PM), https://twitter.com/CRST
Chairman/status/1017544831566921728. 
 354 Id. 
 355 See Landreth et al., supra note 347. 
 356 Rosebud Sioux Tribe v. Trump, 428 F. Supp. 3d 282 (D. Mont. 2019).. 
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president’s authority to decide unilaterally on granting the permit; the 
federal governments fiduciary’s duties over tribal lands; and Congress’s 
role in exercising its exclusive power over international commerce.357  
Notwithstanding the fascinating nature of these constitutional 
questions, they are beyond the focus of this Article.  For this Article, it is 
worth mentioning that the Inter-American Commission of Human 
Rights monitored the situation regarding the construction of Keystone 
XL and the North Dakota access pipeline.  The U.S. has not recognized 
the jurisdiction of the IACtHR, hence the most that the Commission 
could do would be to issue precatory measures.358  But such measures 
can only be taken once the tribes prove that the domestic judicial 
proceedings are not addressing the violation of their human rights.  
It is also worth mentioning that TransCanada alleged harm 
resulting from the tribe’s judicial proceedings in U.S. federal court 
halting construction.359  In December 2019, TransCanada stated in court 
that “[a]bsent a stay of the permanent injunction, [it would] continue to 
suffer irreparable harm.”360  In addition to the existing investments 
made by TransCanada, it could also fall behind the permit’s schedule 
because the injunction created a risk that TransCanada could lose its 
workers.361  
4.  The Biden Administration and the Second Cancelling of 
the Keystone XL Project 
In January 2020, Joe Biden was sworn in as the 45th President of the 
United States of America.  During his campaign, he promised a plan for 
a “clean energy revolution” that included making climate change and 
environmental justice priorities of his administration’s energy 
decisions.362  The promised policies included revoking the permit 
 
 357 Id. 
 358 Press Release, Tribes Ask International Human Rights Commission to Stop Violence 
Against Water Protectors at Standing Rock (Dec. 2, 2016), https://www.indianz.com/
News/2016/12/08/iachrpressrelease120216.pdf. 
 359 Karl Puckett, TransCanada: “Irreparable Harm” if Keystone XL Construction Doesn’t 
Resume, GREAT FALLS TRIB. (Jan. 8, 2019), https://www.greatfallstribune.com/story/
news/2019/01/08/transcanada-asks-court-lift-keystone-construction-ban-during-
appeal-great-falls-judge-brian-morris/2516087002. 
 360 Id. 
 361 Id. 
 362 9 Key Elements of Joe Biden’s Plan for a Clean Energy Revolution, JOE BIDEN FOR 
PRESIDENT, https://joebiden.com/9-key-elements-of-joe-bidens-plan-for-a-clean-
energy-revolution (last visited Mar 5, 2021). 
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granted by the Trump administration for the construction of Keystone 
XL.363  
On January 20, 2021, President Biden followed through with his 
campaign promise and issued an executive order revoking the permit.364  
The revocation order mentioned the State Department’s 2015 
determination and reaffirmed that the project’s approval “would 
undermine U.S. climate leadership by undercutting the credibility and 
influence of the United States in urging other countries to take 
ambitious climate action.”365  The order did not mention the effect that 
the pipeline would have on indigenous lands, the environmental impact 
of the pipeline’s construction in U.S. territory, nor the inadequate 
consultation of indigenous people as justifications for the revocation of 
the permit.366  In other words, the U.S. did not justify its decision based 
on existing obligations or commitments with indigenous communities 
but rather on the need to reestablish U.S. leadership in the fight against 
climate change.  
Canadian investors and the province of Alberta did not take long to 
respond.367  Alberta’s Premier, Jason Kenney, publicly stated that to 
“retroactively remove regulatory approval on the basis of which an 
investment was made is, in my view, a slam dunk case of a claim for 
damages through NAFTA under the investor protection provisions.”368  
TransCanada Energy also issued a statement expressing its 
disappointment with the action and announcing that it would “review 
 
 363 WHITE HOUSE, EXECUTIVE ORDER ON PROTECTING PUBLIC HEALTH AND THE ENVIRONMENT 




 364 Id. 
 365 Id. at § 6.(b) (“In 2015, following an exhaustive review, the Department of State 
and the President determined that approving the proposed Keystone XL pipeline would 
not serve the U.S. national interest.  That analysis, in addition to concluding that the 
significance of the proposed pipeline for our energy security and economy is limited, 
stressed that the United States must prioritize the development of a clean energy 
economy, which will in turn create good jobs.  The analysis further concluded that 
approval of the proposed pipeline would undermine U.S. climate leadership by 
undercutting the credibility and influence of the United States in urging other countries 
to take ambitious climate action.”). 
 366 Id. at §§ 6.(c), 6.(d).  The sections on which the order is based only mention the 
threat that climate change poses to U.S. national security and the need to strengthen U.S. 
international reputation to address it. 
 367 Robert Tuttle, Canada May Seek U.S. Payback via NAFTA After Biden Cancels 
Keystone XL, WORLD OIL (Feb. 4, 2021), https://www.worldoil.com/news/2021/2/4/
canada-may-seek-us-payback-via-nafta-after-biden-cancels-keystone-xl (last visited 
Mar 5, 2021). 
 368 Id. 
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the decision, assess its implications, and consider its options.”369  The 
fact that the Biden administration relied on the same arguments as the 
ones expressed in the 2015 State Department determination leaves the 
door open for TransCanada to reinitiate its NAFTA claim against the 
U.S.370  
The USMCA gives Canadian companies a three-year window to 
bring claims against the U.S. government for existing investments.371  
After that point, the ISDS mechanism will not be available for Canadian 
companies.372  Any dispute would then have to be resolved solely in U.S. 
courts.  At this point, it is uncertain how U.S. courts would implement 
the USMCA provisions under the new Chapter 14 or the references to 
the obligations to indigenous peoples in Article 32.5.373  In the case of 
TransCanada, the Biden administration’s revocation of the permit does 
not mention the U.S. government’s duty to protect indigenous 
communities.  It is thus unclear whether the U.S. could even invoke 
Article 32.5 as part of a plausible defense against TransCanada’s 
investment arbitration claims.  What is true, as explained in previous 
Sections, is that the USMCA invites continued promotion of social 
responsibility principles, but these principles are not a prerequisite for 
the investment to be protected under the treaty.374  Moreover, it is 
unclear how a tribunal might interpret a failure of the State to comply 
with legal obligations to indigenous people as a pretext to modify 
existing permits or licenses that cross indigenous lands.375  
IV.  CONCLUSION 
The international treaties analyzed in this Article show how 
international law recognizes a State’s sovereign right to extract its 
natural resources for the benefit of its citizens.  States have “absolute” 
authority to determine the most effective and efficient way to develop 
and build infrastructure to extract natural resources in their territories.  
 
 369 TC Energy Press Release, TC Energy disappointed with Expected Executive Action 
revoking Keystone XL Presidential Permit, (Jan 20, 2021), https://www.tcenergy.com/
announcements/2021-01-20-tc-energy-disappointed-with-expected-executive-action-
revoking-keystone-xl-presidential-permit (last visited Mar 5, 2021). 
 370 Kyla Tienhaara, Keystone XL Legal Risks Highlight Dangers of Putting Investors 
Before Climate Change, CONVERSATION (Jan. 26, 2021), http://theconversation.com/
keystone-xl-legal-risks-highlight-dangers-of-putting-investors-before-climate-change-
153814 (last visited Mar 5, 2021).  
 371 USMCA, supra note 184, at Annex 14-C. 
 372 Id. at Annex 14-C.3. (“A Party’s consent under paragraph 1 shall expire three years 
after the termination of NAFTA 1994.”). 
 373 Id. 
 374 Id. 
 375 Supra Section II.D. 
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These treaties subtextually conceive of resources as tools for 
development.  In the case of energy projects, it is necessary to drill wells 
to extract oil and gas, and to construct pipelines to transport them, to 
secure the flow of energy products to achieve long-term “development.”  
In the name of undefined development, the State can infringe on the 
property rights of individuals, companies, and/or communities.  The 
remedy left to the affected parties under international law is to receive 
monetary compensation for the infringement upon their rights. 
International law, as such, recognizes both a liberal and utilitarian 
conception of property rights that fails to incorporate other social 
values not connected to the resources’ economic potential.376  This 
liberal and utilitarian version of property rights obscures the fact that 
some property rights conflict with social values not shared by the 
majority of the population, particularly indigenous people.377  The 
conflict with these other noneconomic values is not resolved by granting 
land titles to the communities and forcing them to defend their property 
rights against third-party interference.  The international system places 
the interests of the State to develop the resources above those of the 
indigenous community and grants the affected tribes remedies that 
monetize the value of their property.  
The consequences of these liberal and utilitarian conceptions of 
property rights in international law are even clearer when the clash 
between the State and the communities also involves foreign investors 
extracting resources on behalf of the States.  When foreign energy 
companies are added into the equation, international treaties provide 
them with remedies that are more attuned with their shareholder 
values.  The investment regimes grant foreign investors multimillion-
dollar damages compensations when the State fails to protect them.  
When the communities and the foreign investors’ interests collide, the 
regime leaves governments in an intractable position to decide who to 
compensate, the communities or the investors.  The decision becomes a 
cost-benefit analysis that compares the value of the investment against 
the value of tribal-ancestral land.  One is quantifiable by nature, the 
other is not. 
The international instruments that protect indigenous rights are 
insufficient to fully tame the liberal and utilitarian conceptions behind 
the sovereign rights of the State to extract natural resources.  The 
international laws that protect indigenous rights, including the IACtHR’s 
case law, reinforce the idea that communities have the right to a 
 
 376 Singer, Property and Social Relations, supra note 42, at 7. 
 377 For example, the right of the store owner to exclude and the rights of members of 
the public to enter public accommodations and to engage in contractual relationships. 
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consultation that accounts for their particularities, such as language and 
cultural accommodations and attempts to aid the communities’ 
understanding of an investment’s consequences.  They emphasize the 
fact that the indigenous communities have a right to receive title to their 
property, and so it must be protected by the State.  This Article, however, 
moved the debate to the perspective of the State facing challenges from 
both investors and indigenous rights.  Instead of focusing on the best 
practices for conducting a prior and informed consultation process with 
indigenous communities, it invited the reader to see the conflict that 
emerges when government officials must decide who to protect when a 
conflict occurs between communities and investors.  The cases 
presented here show how the indigenous-rights regime collides with 
the investment regime in the execution of energy-related projects when 
they are executed and not in their planning stages.  This Article argued 
that, notwithstanding the advancements in international indigenous 
rights, the regime does not fully tame the State’s sovereign rights to 
extract natural resources for the benefits of energy projects.   
Even assuming that the pre-extraction consultation process 
respects the principles established by international law, the remedy is 
to compensate monetarily for the loss.  When international courts like 
the IACtHR find violations of the right of consultation, the remedy is 
usually to compensate the communities, along with other public 
remedies such as public declarations, monuments, and creations of 
programs to protect their culture.  But the pipeline ultimately gets 
constructed, the drills perforate tribal land, and roads are built around 
the energy infrastructure.  The regime allows the State to monetize the 
indigenous communities’ interests and compensate them when the 
resources located in their lands are affected by energy projects.  Even if 
it mitigates the exercise of sovereignty, the indigenous-rights regime 
also recognizes the State’s right to exploit their lands for a “public 
benefit.”378  The clash with foreign investors emerges when the State 
acts through private parties, a key characteristic of energy-related 
projects, to develop the natural resources.379  The concessions, 
contracts, and licenses are protected investments in international 
bilateral treaties.  As such, governments receive pressure to protect 
those investments against community unrest.  
 
 378 Anaya & Puig, supra note 20, at 437.  Even Anaya and Puig recognize that the “duty 
entails more than a mere right to be informed and heard but less than the right to veto.”  
Id. 
 379 See generally THE CHARACTER OF PETROLEUM LICENSES: A LEGAL CULTURE ANALYSIS (Tina 
Soliman Hunter et al., eds., 2020). 
GARCIA SANCHEZ (DO NOT DELETE) 4/21/2021  5:43 PM 
2021] DRILLS AND PIPELINES CROSS INDIGENOUS LANDS 1191 
By exposing how energy projects on indigenous lands create a 
clash of rights, this Article sets the stage for future research.  The Article 
invites the reader to redefine property in a way that addresses the 
interests of all the parties involved and the social, cultural, and spiritual 
relationships that natural resources create with different parties.  The 
redefinition of property rights over mineral and energy resources 
should address contemporary needs like community concerns, 
sustainable production of energy, and the protection of companies’ 
long-term financial interests.  Perhaps we could borrow ideas from the 
existing literature on energy justice to address these goals and avoid a 
clash of interests among all the parties involved.380  Energy justice 
advocates for the inclusion of communities in the decision-making 
process, share the benefits of sustainable production, and include their 
spiritual and cultural values in the way projects are designed.381  
Energy-justice advocates argue that energy production should be 
democratized and foster social relations.382  As a new paradigm guiding 
the planning of energy projects, energy justice aims to ensure that 
decisions are made in a democratic and socially inclusive manner.383  
The process is not binary like the right of consultation but rather a 
course of action that requires continuous engagement.384  How do we 
involve communities in the benefits of energy transition?385  How can 
they participate in the process of deliberation to balance different 
sources of energy production?  These are all questions that need to be 
addressed as part of the process, and which go beyond the current 
proposals to codify further the right of consultation, expand the use of 
social corporate responsibility principles, or include amicus briefs in 
investment arbitral proceedings.  
Energy transition through the lens of energy justice offers 
communities an opportunity to own and control clean energy resources 
while reducing localized environmental and health impacts associated 
 
 380 Energy justice exists as a discursive phenomenon that spans the social science and 
legal literatures.  The most frequently referenced framework consists of the following 
tenets: distributive, procedural, and recognition justice.  These together create the 
concept of energy justice.  
 381 See, e.g., Shalanda H. Baker, Mexican Energy Reform, Climate Change, and Energy 
Justice in Indigenous Communities, 56 NAT. RES. J. 369 (2016); Kristen van de Biezenbos, 
The Rebirth of Social Licence, 14 MCGILL J. SUSTAINABLE DEV. L. 149 (2018); Shelley Welton 
& Joel Eisen, Clean Energy Justice: Charting an Emerging Agenda, 43 HARV. ENVTL. L. REV. 
307 (2019); Shelley Welton, Grasping for Energy Democracy, 116 MICH. L. REV. 581 
(2018). 
 382 Welton, Grasping for Energy Democracy, supra note 381, at 581. 
 383 Id. 
 384 See van de Biezenbos, supra note 381, at 167–78. 
 385 Baker, supra note 381. 
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with burning fossil fuels.386  This transition is an opportunity for 
governments and companies to implement equity-centered energy 
policies.387  It further offers an opportunity to reshape the 
socioeconomic relationships created by energy choices.388  As opposed 
to a clash of rights being litigated in separate international tribunals, we 
can start thinking about different ways in which property rights over 
energy sources create social relationships and opportunities to produce 
renewable energy in a socially distributive way.  Moreover, we can begin 
a conversation about ways in which the State can democratize the 
decision-making process for energy projects, as opposed to relying 
exclusively on economic considerations.389   
Finally, as this Article explained, we should also abandon false 
narratives regarding the ways in which communities benefit from 
economic development that results from international trade and 
investment agreements.390  If we continue to emphasize the monetary 
benefit of energy production over any other social value, as the current 
treaties do, communities will be affected and, in many cases, will never 
see the benefits that they are being promised.  If there is one thing that 
we have learned from NAFTA, it is that international trade agreements 
are not the magic formula that ends poverty, migrations, and 
underdevelopment.  The Zapatista indigenous rebellion in Chiapas, 
Mexico—which began the same day that NAFTA came into effect—
warned us of this fact, and we ignored it.  Twenty years later, the same 
underdeveloped regions of Mexico—Oaxaca, Guerrero, Chiapas, 
Tabasco—are coincidently home to most of the nation’s indigenous 
communities, who still face high levels of poverty and exclusion.  They 
have not seen the trickle-down benefits of the trade and investment 
agreements.  Yet, this time, the USMCA and Mexican energy reform are 
bringing foreign investment to their doorsteps.391 
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